Tihan, Eusebiu Jean (2026), „Attitudes and Values in Local Public Administration – The Need for National Security – The Positioning of Intelligence Services, Intelligence Info, 5:1, 76-93, DOI: 10.58679/II99676, https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/attitudes-and-values-in-local-public-administration/

Abstract

Objectives: To analyse the link between public attitudes in local administration and the redefinition of national security in post-communist Romania (2000-2006).

Methods: An interdisciplinary approach combining quantitative analysis of national surveys (the PHARE-FMAPL project), qualitative focus groups, and legal-doctrinal analysis of security frameworks.

Results: Citizen dissatisfaction with corruption and basic services signalled core security vulnerabilities. A personalised trust in leaders coexisted with institutional distrust. The legal concept of national security was successfully redefined from regime survival to a citizen-centric, rule-of-law value, with intelligence services placed under democratic oversight.

Conclusion: National security emerged as a social construct shaped by public psychology and institutional response, forming a pact between the state and citizens in a nascent democracy.

Public Significance Statement: The study demonstrates that genuine national security in a democracy depends on public trust, effective institutions, and the protection of fundamental rights, not merely on secretive state apparatuses.

Keywords: national security, democracy, local administration, citizen attitudes, intelligence services

Atitudini și valori în administrația publică locală – Nevoia de securitate națională – Poziționarea serviciilor de informații

Rezumat

Obiective: Analiza legăturii dintre atitudinile publice în administrația locală și redefinirea securității naționale în România post-comunistă (2000-2006).

Metode: O abordare interdisciplinară care combină analiza cantitativă a sondajelor naționale (proiectul PHARE-FMAPL), grupuri focal calitative și analiza juridico-doctrinară a cadrelor de securitate.

Rezultate: Nemulțumirea cetățenilor față de corupție și servicii de bază a semnalat vulnerabilități esențiale de securitate. O încredere personalizată în lideri a coexistat cu neîncrederea în instituții. Conceptul legal de securitate națională a fost redefinit cu succes de la supraviețuirea regimului la o valoare centrată pe cetățean și statul de drept, iar serviciile de informații au fost plasate sub control democratic.

Concluzie: Securitatea națională s-a constituit ca o construcție socială modelată de psihologia publică și răspunsul instituțional, formând un pact între stat și cetățeni într-o democrație emergentă.

Declarația de Semnificație Publică: Studiul demonstrează că securitatea națională autentică într-o democrație depinde de încrederea publică, instituții eficiente și protecția drepturilor fundamentale, nu doar de aparate de stat secrete.

Cuvinte cheie: securitate națională, democrație, administrație locală, atitudini cetățenești, servicii de informații

INTELLIGENCE INFO, Volumul 5, Numărul 1, Martie 2026, pp. 76-93
ISSN 2821 – 8159, ISSN – L 2821 – 8159, DOI: 10.58679/II99676
URL: https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/attitudes-and-values-in-local-public-administration/
© 2026 Eusebiu Jean TIHAN. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

Attitudes and Values in Local Public Administration – The Need for National Security – The Positioning of Intelligence Services

Psych. Mr(r) Eusebiu Jean TIHAN, MSc[1]
eusebiu.tihan@gmail.com

[1] Independent researcher, Tihan and Associates. Professional Civil Society of Psychology

Introduction: At the Intersection of Social Psychology, Constitutional Law, and National Security

The national security of a country cannot be understood as an isolated, purely normative, or exclusively operational concept. It is, in essence, a complex social product, a direct function of the state of mind, values, and trust that citizens have in state institutions and in their common future. This paper aims to demonstrate this thesis through a diachronic analysis of the Romanian case in the first post-December decade. Starting from the most extensive psycho-sociological studies ever conducted in the field of local public administration in Romania – the PHARE-FMAPL project – we have mapped the transformation of the population’s attitudes and values between 2000 and 2006 [1]. In parallel, we have tracked the concurrent and interdependent evolution of the legal concept of national security and the institutional architecture designed to protect it – the intelligence services.

The objective of this article is twofold. Firstly, to highlight how the need for security, in its broadest sense of stability, predictability, and respect for rights, was expressed – sometimes indirectly – through citizens’ perceptions and grievances regarding public services, corruption, and the political class. Secondly, to analyse how this social need was captured, formalised, and institutionalised through the democratic reconstruction of the national security apparatus, with a focus on the intelligence services, now defined as instruments of the rule of law state and not against it.

The methodology is interdisciplinary, based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of primary data from surveys, focus groups, and psychological tests, correlated with content analysis of the normative framework (Constitution, Law no. 51/1991, related legislative texts) and the doctrine on the organisation and control of intelligence services in a democracy. Through this approach, the article seeks to offer a unified perspective on how the collective psychology of a society in transition and its security architecture mutually shape each other, with the need for national security becoming the nodal point of this interaction.

Methodological Positioning and Epistemological Limits

This research sits at the intersection of several disciplines – social psychology, political science, constitutional law, and security studies – adopting an interdisciplinary approach to analyse the relationship between citizens’ attitudes and values in local public administration and the conceptual-institutional (re)definition of national security in post-December Romania.

The methodology combines:

Quantitative analysis of primary data obtained from nationally representative opinion polls conducted within the PHARE-FMAPL (Programme for the Improvement of Local Public Administration) project between 2000 and 2006. This data allows for the mapping of the evolution of citizens’ perceptions, satisfaction, and dissatisfaction with public services, authorities, and phenomena such as corruption.
Qualitative analysis of data from focus groups and interviews, which provided depth and context for understanding the logic of the values and attitudes expressed in the surveys.
Content analysis of the normative and doctrinal framework, tracking the semantic and legal evolution of the concept of “national security” (from Law no. 51/1991 to its republication) and the architecture of the intelligence services. This analysis was corroborated with international specialist literature on the democratic control of intelligence services (e.g., DCAF, 2002) [2].

Through the triangulation of these methods, the study aims to provide a unified perspective on how psychosocial dynamics (the micro-level) and institutional-normative transformations (the macro-level) have mutually influenced each other in defining the need for national security.

The epistemological limits of this approach are acknowledged and include:

Specificity of the historical context: The analysis focuses almost exclusively on a specific decade (2000-2006), crucial for Romania’s post-communist transition. Generalising the conclusions to other periods or states must be done cautiously, taking into account historical and cultural particularities.
Nature of the secondary data: The psychosocial analysis is based primarily on data collected within an extensive project (PHARE-FMAPL). Although these are extremely valuable and unique in scope, their interpretation in this study is subject to the author’s theoretical framework.
Challenge of interdisciplinary integration: Synthesising perspectives from psychology, law, and political science involves the risk of a certain “management” of the complexity of each field. The effort was to maintain the rigour of each perspective, focusing on their significant points of intersection.
Access to classified information: The analysis of intelligence services is based exclusively on public documents (laws, doctrine, parliamentary committee reports, academic literature). Access to operational classified documents was not possible, which limits the perspective to the formal legal framework and declared operating principles, rather than concrete practices.

Despite these limits, the chosen approach is considered the most appropriate to highlight the fundamental connection between the state of mind of a society in transition and the reconfiguration of its security architecture, demonstrating that national security in a democracy is, ultimately, a social construction and a normative pact.

1. The Psychosocial Map of Post-December Romania (2000-2006): Expectations, Grievances, and Deep Values

The period immediately following the parliamentary and presidential elections in the autumn of 2000 marked a turning point in Romanian collective psychology. Studies indicate the establishment of a palpable “state of expectation” for “major transformations at the community level” [3]. This sentiment was fuelled by a “capital of trust” transferred from the new central government to local authorities, making mayors, regardless of their concrete performance, perceived as “more intelligent, more responsible, more efficient, more courageous” [3]. This “electoral halo effect” highlighted a first profound trait of post-communist Romanian society: the tendency to personalise hope and to project expectations of change onto charismatic leaders, rather than onto institutional structures or political programmes.

1.1. Satisfaction with Public Services: A Diagnosis of the State of the Country

The research provides a detailed radiography of the population’s satisfaction, which functions as a barometer of trust in the state. At the positive pole, the services ensuring basic functionality and order were the most appreciated: water supply (61%), maintaining public order (60%), public service provision by the Town Hall (54%), maintenance of educational units (53%), and public transport (52%) [3]. These figures suggest that the population valued, first and foremost, predictability and normality – the state’s ability to ensure the routine functioning of community life.

In contrast, dissatisfaction focused on areas involving major investments, strategic planning, or the firm application of the law: road repairs (67% dissatisfied), consolidation of degraded buildings (64%), monitoring of stray dogs (53%), environmental protection (52%), and housing construction (51%) [3]. This distribution of dissatisfaction is revealing: it indicates not only technical deficiencies but, above all, a perception of the state’s incapacity to act in complex areas, to plan for the long term, and to impose order in public space. Infrastructure deficiencies and urban degradation were perceived not just as discomfort, but as signs of continuous instability and decay.

1.2. The Differentiated Geography of Perceptions and Values: Four Romanias

Regional analysis reveals four distinct psychosocial profiles, each with specific implications for defining security needs.

Bucharest – Chronic Dissatisfaction and Maximum Expectations: The capital stands out for the most acute degree of criticism. Dissatisfaction with road quality (78%), cleanliness (69%), school (90%) and hospital (88%) maintenance, degraded buildings (94%), and polluted environment (79%) [3] paints a picture of a metropolis in deep crisis. Its citizens, the most educated and with access to information, were the most sensitive to the gap between expectations of European modernity and urban reality. Here, dissatisfaction was not only functional but also symbolic – linked to the status of the capital. Paradoxically, this acute dissatisfaction coexisted with “the highest expectations” for improvement [3], generating a high potential for frustration and demands towards the authorities.
Moldova – The Value of Public Order and Security: In contrast, inhabitants of Moldova reported the highest satisfaction with “safety and public order” (70%) [3]. This region, often associated with poverty and emigration, placed a particular premium on stability and the absence of dangers. Physical security and the predictability of daily life appeared as supreme values, compensating for possible deficiencies in other services. This suggests that, under precarious socio-economic conditions, the need for basic security (protection of physical integrity and property) becomes paramount and defines the relationship with the state.
Transylvania – Focus on Heritage and Environment: Here, positive perceptions focused on street lighting, maintenance of cultural and sports institutions, modernisation of historic centres, and environmental protection works (embankments, consolidation) [3]. This indicates a community with a more developed awareness of quality of life, collective heritage, and sustainability. The need for security extends beyond physical safety, towards patrimonial and environmental security.
Muntenia – Pride in Basic Services and Administration: Inhabitants of this area declared themselves proud of performance in maintaining cultural and educational institutions, road repairs, and citizen service by the Town Hall [3]. An image emerges of a relationship with local authority focused on administrative efficiency and service accessibility.

These parallel maps demonstrate that the “need for security” was not a monolithic concept. It varied from the demand for public order and physical security in Moldova, to the demand for good administration and transparency in Muntenia, to the desire for quality of life and environmental protection in Transylvania, and to a generalised need for the restoration of normality and status in Bucharest.

1.3. Perception of Authorities: Personalised Trust and Institutional Deficit

The image of different categories of authorities reflects a society that entrusts its hopes to individuals but fears structures.

The Mayor – Charisma and Visibility: Mayors were invested with considerable sympathy and trust, largely due to their visibility in public space. The “Băsescu model” – trenchant discourse, appeal to the law, dynamism – was copied by many provincial mayors, managing to capture public attention [3]. Their popularity even exceeded that of police officers, prefects, or representatives of the judiciary, being surpassed only by that of teachers [3]. This again confirms the extreme personalisation of trust.
Local Councillors – Invisibility and Legitimacy Deficit: In clear contrast, local councillors were marginal in public perception. “Poor media coverage of meetings” led to the idea that “time is wasted in administration buildings” [3]. A quarter of subjects did not know what the councillors had done, and a third declared they had done nothing [3]. This institutional invisibility of the deliberative body undermined the legitimacy of the local democratic process and created a void in understanding how decisions are made.
Public Officials – Ambiguity between Neighbour and Bureaucrat: The image of officials was deeply split. On the one hand, they were accused of indifference (74%), servility (68%), “pointless red tape” (65%), political appointments (58%), and corruption [3]. On the other hand, in small and rural environments, where contact was personalised, they were perceived as amiable (58%) but powerless (47%) [3]. This paradox highlighted a role conflict: citizens wanted an accessible and human official (like a neighbour), but also efficient and impartial (like an agent of the rule of law state). The failure to combine these expectations fuelled a culture of generalised suspicion towards bureaucracy.
Political Parties – Indifference and the Leader Exception: Almost half of the citizens believed that parties hampered local development through indifference and inactivity [3]. With the exception of the PDSR (perceived as supportive by 51% of subjects), parties were seen as doing nothing. Support was associated, again, with the presence of a charismatic mayor who would “transmit charisma” to his party [3]. This separation between leader and structure is significant for democratic security: it indicates a fragile adherence to the formal structures of democracy, making the system vulnerable to populism and leaders promising quick solutions outside institutional channels.

1.4. Deep Values: Attachment, Emigration, and the Gap between Vote and Convictions

Behind these perceptions lay fundamental values and attitudes.

Local Attachment vs. Lack of Urban ‘Soul’: Although 73% of subjects manifested a strong attachment to their place of residence (especially in rural areas), many complained about the “lack of opportunities for leisure time” and the “non-existence of a city’s soul”[3]. This lack of a “clear, consistent, and evocative identity” created a symbolic void. Citizens felt connected to home and family, but not to a vibrant and meaningful public space. This void could be filled by marginal subcultures or hostile narratives.
Desire to Emigrate – A Function of Poverty: An alarming segment of 14% of Romanians wanted to spend their future in another country, the proportion rising to 37% among those with higher education, 30% among young people, and 25% among Bucharest residents [3]. The reason was not a lack of patriotism (84.5% declared themselves strongly connected to Romania), but “generalised poverty”[3]. This potential haemorrhage of human capital, especially of the young and educated elite, constituted a serious threat to long-term security, eroding the country’s economic capacity, innovation, and social cohesion.
Vote-Values Dissociation – A Sign of an Immature Democracy: One of the most revealing findings is that, although they had voted for a social-democratic party (PDSR), the population remained “adherents of liberal values” in administration: closing polluting enterprises, property restitution, eliminating subsidies, privatising services, decentralisation [3]. This gap between the momentary political choice and fundamental long-term values [3] showed that the 2000 vote was given to “people perceived as competent and not to political programmes”. This volatility and lack of ideological anchoring created fertile ground for rapid changes in alliances and for a clientelistic type of democracy, where loyalties are personal, not programmatic.

In conclusion, the psychosocial map of Romania in the 2000s illustrated a society in transition, marked by:

An acute need for normality, stability, and order (expressed through satisfaction with basic services and dissatisfaction with chaos and degradation).
Personalised trust in charismatic leaders, but generalised suspicion towards institutional structures (councils, bureaucracy, parties).
Background liberal values, but opportunistic or personalistic electoral behaviour.
Strong local attachment, but a lack of urban identity and a strong tendency for emigration among the young and educated.

This amalgam of expectations, frustrations, and values constituted the social substratum from which the redefined need for national security would grow and to which it would have to respond.

2. The (Re)conceptual and Normative Construction of National Security in the Romanian Rule of Law State

In parallel with these psychosocial changes, the concept of national security itself underwent a process of radical redefinition. After 1989, the phrase “state security” was negatively charged, associated with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime. However, after “a few decades, society decided to confer a terminological actuality to the concept” [4]. This rehabilitation was not a return to the old model, but a democratic reinvention.

2.1. From Siguranță to Securitate: A Semantic and Legal Evolution

The first post-revolutionary normative framework was Law no. 51/1991 “on siguranța națională (national safety/security)”. The term “siguranță” had a more restrictive connotation, similar to “safety”. International evolution and the need for a comprehensive concept led to the strategic-level differentiation between “siguranța națională” and “securitatea națională“, the latter becoming the “umbrella” encompassing national defence, national safety, and public order [4]. Through the republication of the law in 2014, Article 1 of Law no. 51/1991 definitively adopted the concept of “securitatea națională a României (the national security of Romania)”, defined as:

“a state of legality, balance, and social, economic and political stability necessary for the existence and development of the Romanian national state as a sovereign, unitary, independent, and indivisible state, for the maintenance of the rule of law, as well as for the climate of unimpeded exercise of the rights, freedoms and fundamental duties of citizens, according to the democratic principles and norms defined and consented to by the Constitution” [4].

This definition is fundamental. It transforms national security from a narrow concept, centred on regime survival, into an expansive one centred on the citizen. Security no longer means just the absence of military threats, but the presence of a state of democratic normality: legality, balance, socio-economic stability, rule of law, and, essentially, the guarantee of exercising fundamental rights and freedoms. The need to “live in a safe environment” is thus reinterpreted as the necessity of living in a functional rule of law state [4].

2.2. The Constitutive Tension: The Citizen’s Duty vs. Fundamental Rights

The law, however, introduces an interesting tension. While Article 1 guarantees the exercise of rights, paragraph (2) of Article 2 stipulates that “citizens of Romania have a moral duty to contribute to the achievement of national security” [4]. This “moral duty” is in formal contradiction with another legal text, Article 228 of Law no. 303/2022, which obliges magistrates to declare annually that they are not collaborators of any intelligence service [4]. This contradiction highlights the central dilemma of security in a democracy: to what extent can citizen involvement in the security effort be demanded without endangering the independence of institutions or individual privacy?

2.3. National Security as a Fundamental Social Value and Legal Principle

In the new paradigm, national security becomes a “social value of major public interest”, protected by the force of the Constitution [4]. It is no longer just an area of action for specialised structures, but an organising principle of the entire legal and administrative system. The right to life, to physical integrity, and to freedom – guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 22) – become, in a normative key, of “security relevance” [4]. The lack of protection for these fundamental rights threatens the entire state construct.

This evolution also reflects the internalisation of international norms. In international law, states reserve the right to invoke the “national security exception” to deviate from certain treaty obligations. However, international courts have begun to examine these exceptions, emphasising the legitimate and proportional character of the measures, so that they do not excessively interfere with fundamental rights [4]. Thus, at the international level, external control is imposed on how states use the security argument.

In conclusion, the analysed period witnessed the transformation of national security from an instrument of the state (often against citizens) into an objective of the rule of law state (in the service of citizens). The need for security expressed by the population – for order, stability, respect for the law – thus found a sophisticated normative echo. The next question is how the specialised institutions – the intelligence services – were reorganised to serve this new objective, and how they respond to the psychosocial profiles identified earlier.

3. The Democratic Architecture of Intelligence Services: Mission, Limits, and Control

The refoundation of intelligence services after 1989 was an essential component of the democratic transition. It involved not only a change of personnel but a philosophical redefinition of the mission, the relationship with society, and the framework of action. In a democracy, intelligence services are not a “state within the state”, but a specialised instrument of the government, operating under the rule of law and democratic control.

3.1. Basic Philosophy: The Delicate Balance between Efficiency and Liberty

The fundamental role of intelligence services is to provide information and analysis to support the decision-making process, especially in the areas of internal, external, and defence security (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 2002) [2]. However, their activity is in a permanent field of tension: “The requirements of national security and state protection are sometimes in contradiction with the established concepts of confidentiality, civil liberties and civil rights that the same state grants to its citizens” [4]. Finding a correct political and legal compromise between these divergent interests is the fundamental task of any democratic framework.

3.2. Organisation and Specialisation: Internal/External Separation and Specialised Services

A first organisational principle is the clear separation between internal and external intelligence services (DCAF, 2002) [2]. This separation is justified by different missions and distinct legal regimes applicable on national territory versus activities abroad.

Internal services focus on threats to internal security: terrorism, espionage, sabotage, transnational organised crime, subversion [4]. Their activity must strictly comply with national law, including data protection laws.
External services monitor threats, opportunities, and intentions of foreign powers, organisations, or persons that pose a risk to the state and its interests [4]. They cannot be subjected to the laws of the countries in which they operate but are strictly controlled at the political level by their own government.

Alongside these, there are specialised services, such as military intelligence services (which analyse the military potential of other states) or technical ones (imagery, signal interception, cryptology) [4]. These form a “third segment” of the intelligence community.

3.3. Counterintelligence: The Reactive Function and the Need for Coordination

Counterintelligence represents the effort to counteract the activities of foreign intelligence services and subversive groups supported from abroad [4]. Unlike offensive intelligence gathering, counterintelligence is largely reactive. A separate service is not necessary, but rather a centralised programme to integrate, coordinate, and improve the efforts of all services in this domain [4]. This is vital to address threats that cross borders: an extremist group may plan attacks in the country (internal domain) but may be supported from abroad (external domain) [4].

3.4. The Imperative of Secrecy: The Condition for Efficiency and a Potential Source of Abuse

The nature of the activity imposes secrecy. Three categories of information are fundamentally classified:

Details about operations, sources, methods, and procedures.
The identity of operational personnel.
The origin of information received from other secret services [4].

Secrecy is necessary to protect sources, maintain the effectiveness of methods, and respect the trust of international partners. However, this “secret character” creates a temptation to act independently and constitutes the main barrier to democratic control [4]. Therefore, in a democracy, secrecy is not absolute but managed through a system of authorisations and oversight.

3.5. Crucial Delimitation from the Legal and Law Enforcement System

An essential separation is that between intelligence services and judicial/police bodies. The purposes are fundamentally different:

Intelligence services aim to collect as much information as possible about potential threats, often preferring not to immediately arrest a suspect if that allows them to monitor a wider network.
Police and the judiciary aim to gather evidence to convict in a specific criminal case[4].

Internal intelligence services are justified in investigating a group if it has caused or there is a clear conviction that it will cause violence. The repression of common crimes remains within the sphere of law. Furthermore, intelligence services must never be involved in internal political activities [4]. This delimitation protects both the independence of the political process and the integrity of the services.

3.6. The Democratic Oversight System: Executive, Legislative, Judicial

To manage the tension between the power granted to the services and the risk of abuse, modern democracies have instituted a tripartite oversight system (DCAF, 2002) [2].

Executive oversight is the first and most direct line. The government, through the responsible minister, authorises important operations and is accountable for the strategic direction of the services. A well-defined authorisation regime (sometimes signed by the minister or approved by a judicial body) ensures that the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected before an intrusive action is undertaken [4].
Legislative oversight is carried out by specialised parliamentary committees. These have access to classified information, can hear the heads of the services, investigate abuse allegations, and control budgets. Their mission is delicate: they must be interrogative and critical but must not become adversaries or, conversely, advocates for the services. They must maintain a working relationship based on trust without compromising independence [4].
Judicial oversight ensures that the activities of the services are carried out within the law. The General Prosecutor’s Office (or a similar structure) receives reports, analyses the legality of activities, and can open investigations. The law must establish clear procedures for the collection, use, and storage of information, limiting it to what is strictly necessary for achieving legitimate governmental objectives [4]. Courts of law can verify the legality of measures in concrete cases.

This complex framework demonstrates that in a democracy, the power of intelligence services is granted, limited, and controlled. It is not an end in itself but a means to defend the democratic constitutional order, which includes first and foremost the catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms [4]. The reform of these services was a difficult process, requiring clear legal frameworks, mission definition, parliamentary involvement, and public debate [4].

4. The Critical Link: How Public Attitudes Shape the Need for and Positioning of Intelligence Services

Given the two parallel analyses – of Romanian psychosocial dynamics and the architecture of intelligence services – we can now identify the crucial points of contact where the former determined, justified, or complicated the latter. Romania’s need for national security emerges precisely from this intersection.

4.1. Chronic Dissatisfaction and Perceived Corruption: Warning Signals for Internal Security

Survey data showed deep dissatisfaction with corruption and administrative inefficiency. Citizens identified hospitals, courts, police, schools, and town halls as the most corrupt institutions [3]. This perception was not just a problem of good governance; it constituted a direct threat to internal security. Systematic corruption erodes trust in the state, undermines the authority of the law, and creates spaces of impunity that can be exploited by criminal or subversive groups. The fact that citizens in large cities (especially Bucharest) were the most dissatisfied and expressed the most vehement accusations [3] indicated areas of potential social instability and resentment towards the system.

Therefore, one of the main priorities for the reformed internal intelligence services had to be monitoring the infiltration of organised crime into state structures and the economy, as well as how corruption could be exploited by hostile foreign interests. Public dissatisfaction was, in this sense, an early barometer of security vulnerabilities.

4.2. The Value of Order in Moldova vs. Chaos in Bucharest: Implications for Operational Priorities

The difference between satisfaction with public order in Moldova (70%) and dissatisfaction in Bucharest had direct implications for intelligence services. In Moldova, the perception of well-managed basic security created an environment with less potential for internal violence or massive social disturbances. In contrast, in Bucharest, acute dissatisfaction with public order and urban degradation signalled an environment with high social tensions, potentially explosive. This required internal services to allocate increased resources and attention to monitoring the potential for violent protest, extremism, or urban crime in the capital. The need for security materialised differently: in Moldova, it was a need to maintain stability; in Bucharest, it was an urgent need to restore order and trust.

4.3. Local Attachment and the Identity Void: Vulnerability to Foreign Influence and Subversive Discourse

Although local attachment was high, complaints about the lack of a “city’s soul” and a clear collective identity in small and medium-sized towns [3] represented a subtle but important security risk. These identity voids can be filled by populist narratives, extreme nationalism, or even foreign propaganda promising a renewal of the community on ethnic bases or historical resentments. External and internal intelligence services needed to be sensitive to this issue, monitoring the informational and financial influence efforts of states seeking to exploit these fragilities to affect Romania’s interests. Cultural security and national identity security thus become components of national security.

4.4. The Elite’s Desire to Emigrate: A Strategic Threat to State Capacity

The strong tendency of young people with higher education to emigrate was identified as the most important long-term threat derived from the psychosocial data. This “brain drain” undermined national security by:

Eroding economic capacity and innovation potential.
Ageing and demographic decline, impacting the labour force and the defence system.
Creating a potentially unstable diaspora that, under certain conditions, could be mobilised against the interests of the country of origin.

External intelligence services would have had to monitor how other states or organisations attempt to recruit or influence this diaspora. Moreover, this threat underlined that authentic national security cannot be separated from economic and social development. A truly comprehensive national security policy must include strategies for retaining and attracting talent.

4.5. Suspicion of Officials and the Demand for Transparency: The Imperative of Rigorous Democratic Control

The negative image of public officials and complaints about “pointless red tape” and corruption [3] created a culture of generalised suspicion towards any authority operating in secret. This suspicion was naturally transferred to the intelligence services, whose activities are, by definition, opaque. Precisely for this reason, the democratic oversight framework described earlier became not just a theoretical requirement of democracy but a condition of legitimacy for the intelligence services in the eyes of the Romanian public.

The presence of powerful parliamentary committees, judicial control, and a clear law (Law 51) was essential to build legitimate trust – not blind trust, but one based on verification and accountability – between citizens and their security institutions. The public demand for transparency and good governance, expressed through grievances, thus imposed a certain model of organisation and control for intelligence services. An intelligence service that would have acted with “unlimited powers” would have been, in the context of this suspicion, unacceptable and counterproductive, causing “serious and unacceptable damage to civil rights and liberties” [4].

4.6. Vote-Values Dissociation and the Personalisation of Trust: Risk for Democratic Stability

The fact that citizens voted based on personality, not programmes, and that they maintained values different from those of the chosen party, created an unstable and unpredictable democracy. This instability is a vulnerability for national security, as it can lead to sudden changes in foreign or internal policy, political crises, and a lack of continuity in security strategies. The intelligence services had to operate in such an environment, remaining apolitical and loyal to the rule of law state, not to a particular party or leader, to ensure continuity and professionalism regardless of political fluctuations. The prohibition on involvement in internal politics was thus a protective measure both for democracy and for the integrity of the services themselves.

Conclusions: The Need for National Security – An Emergent Synthesis of Social Psychology and State Architecture

This article has demonstrated that, in Romania of the first post-December decade, the need for national security was a complex phenomenon, emergent from the close interaction between the psychosocial state of the population and the normative and institutional response of the state.

On the one hand, the population expressed a multifaceted need for security through its attitudes and values:

A need for normality and stability, manifested through satisfaction with basic public services that ensure daily functionality.
A need for order and protection, expressed through dissatisfaction with urban chaos, degraded infrastructure, and corruption, and through appreciation of public order in certain regions.
A need for trust and legitimacy, reflected in suspicion towards anonymous structures (councils, bureaucracy) and the desire for transparency.
A need for identity and prospects, highlighted by local attachment but also by the urban identity void and the massive desire of educated youth to emigrate.

On the other hand, the Romanian state, through its process of democratic (re)construction, institutionally and normatively redefined this need:

It transformed national security from an instrument of population control into a fundamental social value centred on guaranteeing the rule of law and citizens’ rights (republished Law 51/1991).
It reconstructed the intelligence services as specialised instruments of this rule of law state, with clearly separated missions (internal/external), operated under principles of necessity and proportionality, and subjected to a robust tripartite system of democratic oversight (executive, legislative, judicial).
It attempted to find a normative balance between the citizen’s duty to contribute to security and the guarantee of their fundamental rights.

The critical link between the two is that the institutional response was, in many respects, determined and justified by the psychosocial profile of the population.

Suspicion of authorities made democratic control over the services a condition of legitimacy, not just a formal requirement.
Dissatisfaction and perceived corruption identified internal security vulnerabilities (organised crime infiltration, erosion of trust) that internal services had to address.
The identity void and vote-values dissociation signalled risks for social cohesion and political stability, making the monitoring of hybrid threats (informational influence, subversion) a priority.
The haemorrhage of human capital underscored that long-term national security is inextricably linked to economic and social development.

Therefore, Romania’s need for national security in this crucial period of transition can be defined as: the imperative to build and maintain a functional, stable, and predictable rule of law state, capable of protecting the physical integrity and sovereignty of the state, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of citizens, ensuring public order and security, countering internal and external threats through professional and democratically controlled institutions, and creating the conditions for economic and social development that counters instability and offers prospects to the young, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the entire system in the eyes of its citizens.

This need was not imposed from above but grew from the foundations of a society in search of normality and from the response of a political class that tried, through trial and error, to build institutions capable of satisfying it. The diachronic analysis of attitudes, values, and the positioning of intelligence services not only maps this evolution but offers a paradigm for understanding that, in a democracy, authentic national security is always a social construction and a pact between the state and its citizens.

References

[1] Tihan E., (2001). Tipuri psihologice în administrația publică locală, pag 121-143, în lucrarea Bruno Ștefan (coord), Pavel Popescu Neveanu, Manuela Ghiureșan, Atitudini și valori în administrația publică locală. [Raport de cercetare în cadrul proiectului PHARE-FMAPL]. Editura BCS. ISBN 973-85278-2-1.

[2] Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). (2002). Intelligence services and democracy. Geneva, Switzerland.

[3] Tihan, E. (2006). Serviciile de informații și democrația. În Științe socio-umane și rolul lor în actualul mediu de securitate (secțiunea III). A XII-a sesiune de comunicări științifice: România în contextul politicii de securitate europeană (Vol. II, pp. 176–190). Editura ANI. (Traducere și adaptare după: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2002).

[4] Tihan, E. (2001). Atitudini și valori în administrația. Manuscris nepublicat.

Cited Legislation

Constituția României, 1991 (with subsequent amendments).
Legea nr. 51/1991 privind securitatea națională a României, republicată în 2014 (Law no. 51/1991 on the national security of Romania, republished in 2014).
Legea nr. 303/2022 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor (Law no. 303/2022 on the status of judges and prosecutors).