Tihan, Eusebiu Jean (2026), Information Aggression Against Romania’s Interests Through the Influencing of Political Life (Internal and External), Intelligence Info, 5:3, DOI: 10.58679/II87600, https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/en/information-aggression-against-romanias-interests/

 

Abstract

In the current geopolitical context, marked by the intensification of hybrid warfare and the use of information as a strategic weapon, Romania is facing a systematic information aggression aimed at undermining democratic processes and influencing political life. The annulled presidential elections of December 2024 represented a turning point, revealing the scale and sophistication of the influence operations carried out against the Romanian state.

Keywords: information aggression, hybrid warfare, political influence, political entities, candidate selection, political marketing, political migration, social cohesion, disinformation, national security

Agresiunea informațională asupra intereselor României prin influențarea vieții politice (interne și externe)

Rezumat

În actualul context geopolitic, marcat de intensificarea războiului hibrid și de folosirea informației ca armă strategică, România se confruntă cu o agresiune informațională sistematică ce vizează subminarea proceselor democratice și influențarea vieții politice. Alegerile prezidențiale anulate din decembrie 2024 au reprezentat un moment de răscruce, dezvăluind amploarea și sofisticarea operațiunilor de influență desfășurate împotriva statului român.

Cuvinte cheie: agresiune informațională, război hibrid, influențare politică, entități politice, selecție candidați, marketing politic, migrație politică, coeziune socială, dezinformare, securitate națională

 

INTELLIGENCE INFO, Volumul 5, Numărul 3, Septembrie 2026, pp. xxx
ISSN 2821 – 8159, ISSN – L 2821 – 8159, DOI: 10.58679/II87600
URL: https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/en/information-aggression-against-romanias-interests/
© 2026 Eusebiu Jean TIHAN. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

 

Information Aggression Against Romania’s Interests Through the Influencing of Political Life (Internal and External)

Psych. Eusebiu Jean TIHAN, MSc[1]
eusebiu.tihan@gmail.com

[1] Academy of Scientists – Romania, https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8316-3679

 

Extended Abstract

Context: In the current geopolitical context, marked by the intensification of hybrid warfare and the use of information as a strategic weapon, Romania is facing a systematic information aggression aimed at undermining democratic processes and influencing political life. The annulled presidential elections of December 2024 represented a turning point, revealing the scale and sophistication of the influence operations carried out against the Romanian state.

Objectives: This article aims to: (1) analyse the mechanisms of information aggression against political life in Romania; (2) examine the specific modalities of action: the creation of political entities, the selection of representative persons, the movement of members between formations and the dissolution of entities; (3) evaluate the effects on the cohesion and consensus of the population; (4) formulate strategic recommendations for increasing democratic resilience.

Methods: The research adopts a qualitative methodology, based on the analysis of official documents (SRI reports, CCR decisions, the Romanian Constitution), specialist literature and recent case studies (the Georgescu case, the 2024-2025 elections).

Results: The analysis reveals the existence of a structured model of information aggression that includes: the construction of political actors through advanced techniques of political marketing and electoral branding; the careful selection of persons with the potential to represent different segments of the electorate; the facilitation of political migration to disorganise the party system; the strategic dissolution of entities to fragment the electorate. The cumulative effects generate cognitive chaos, institutional disorganisation and civic disengagement, profoundly affecting social cohesion.

Public utility statement: Understanding the mechanisms of information aggression against political life is essential for security professionals, for political decision-makers and for citizens. The article offers a reference framework for the development of effective countering strategies and for increasing the democratic resilience of Romanian society.

INTRODUCTION

On 6 December 2024, the Constitutional Court of Romania took an unprecedented decision in the country’s democratic history: it annulled the entire process of the presidential elections, just two days before the second round of voting was due to take place. The decision came following the declassification of documents from the Romanian Intelligence Service which revealed the scale of foreign interference in the electoral process – a network of 66,000 accounts on TikTok, external funding of over 50 million euros and coordination with actors linked to the Russian intelligence services (Mutler, 2025).

The surprise candidate who had triggered this crisis, Călin Georgescu, a former UN official who was accused of adoring Romania’s fascist and communist regimes and of considering Ukraine an “invented state” (Mutler, 2025), had won the first round with 23% of the vote, although polls had consistently placed him at the level of statistical error. His lightning success was not an accident, but the result of a sophisticated influence operation, prepared starting in 2016, which methodically built the image of an “ideal president” for different segments of the electorate (Mutler, 2025; Anghel, 2025).

The Georgescu case is not an isolated incident, but a symptom of a systemic information aggression directed against Romania’s interests. This aggression targets the very capacity of the Romanian state to conduct its democratic processes unaltered, to maintain its geostrategic orientation and to preserve the social cohesion necessary for the functioning of a resilient society.

This article aims to analyse this information aggression through the lens of its impact on political life, both internal and external. We will examine the concrete modalities of action – the creation of political entities, the selection of representative persons, the movement of members between formations and their strategic dissolution – and we will evaluate the cumulative effects on the cohesion of the population. Finally, we will formulate strategic recommendations for increasing Romania’s democratic resilience in the face of these hybrid threats.

1. METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONING AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITS

1.1. Methodological Framework

This research adopts a qualitative methodology, based on documentary analysis and case study. The choice of this approach is justified by the nature of the object of study – information aggression against political life – which involves complex phenomena, difficult to quantify exclusively through quantitative methods.

The documentary sources used include:

• Declassified official documents: Reports of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI, 2024), decisions of the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR, 2024), communications from regulatory authorities, the Constitution of Romania (2003)
• Academic literature: Studies on political migration in Romania (Ghencea & Murphy, 2024), comparative analyses of illiberal discourse (Lukács, 2024), research on the organisation of populist parties (Soare, 2023), analysis of the party system (Popescu & Soare, 2017)
• Press articles and journalistic analyses: BBC reports (2025), G4Media analyses (2025), publications from specialised think tanks (CEPA, Journal of Democracy)
• Legislative documents: The Constitution of Romania, Law on Political Parties no. 14/2003, the Administrative Code

1.2. Epistemological Limits

The research faces a series of inherent limits:

Limited access to classified information: A significant part of the data regarding influence operations remains in the classified sphere, which means that the analysis is based on declassified information, inevitably partial.

Event-driven dynamics: The phenomena analysed are ongoing (including the electoral process of May 2025), which limits the capacity to draw definitive conclusions.

Difficult attribution: In the field of information warfare, attributing operations with certainty to specific actors is often problematic, involving a degree of probability, not absolute certainty.

Causal complexity: The effects on social cohesion and electoral behaviour are the result of multiple factors, difficult to isolate and attribute exclusively to information aggression.

Being aware of these limits, the present research assumes an exploratory and analytical role, aiming to offer a coherent conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon and to substantiate strategic recommendations.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INFORMATION AGGRESSION AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON IN HYBRID WARFARE

2.1. Defining the Concept of Information Aggression

By information aggression we understand the totality of hostile actions, carried out by state or non-state actors, which target the information space of a country with the aim of influencing decision-making processes, undermining trust in institutions and altering the capacity for correct perception of reality at the level of the population and the political elite.

Information aggression differs from simple influence operations through:

• Hostile character: The actions are directed against the national interests of the target country
• Systemic dimension: It targets not just isolated events, but the very functioning of the democratic system
• Strategic coordination: The actions are part of a broader plan, with clear medium and long-term objectives
• Use of significant resources: It involves considerable financial, technological and human investments

2.2. Objectives of Information Aggression against Romania

The analysis of declassified documents (SRI, 2024) and recent political developments allows the identification of clear strategic objectives of the information aggression directed against Romania:

At the internal level:

• Undermining electoral processes and the legitimacy of democratic institutions
• Eroding trust in mainstream parties and the traditional political class
• Amplifying social polarisation and existing divisions
• Promoting political actors who support narratives favourable to the aggressor

At the external level:

• Weakening Romania’s cohesion with strategic allies (NATO, EU)
• Promoting neutralism and scepticism towards Western alliances
• Undermining Romanian support for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova
• Creating a “Trojan horse” within Euro-Atlantic structures

2.3. Geopolitical Context: Ukraine, the Black Sea and NATO’s Eastern Flank

Romania’s geostrategic position transforms it into a priority target of information aggression. Situated on NATO’s eastern flank, bordering Ukraine and with a maritime frontier on the Black Sea, Romania hosts critical military infrastructure of the Alliance and plays an essential role in deterring Russian influence in the region.

The war in Ukraine has significantly intensified these operations. Data shows that Romanians have become one of the most sceptical publics in the EU regarding military and financial support for Ukraine, with many perceiving NATO, not Russia, as the main threat to peace (Anghel, 2025). This shift in perception is not spontaneous, but the result of systematic disinformation campaigns that have exploited existing vulnerabilities.

2.4. The Fundamental Institutions of the Romanian State – Targets of Information Aggression

To fully understand the scale of information aggression, it is essential to have a clear picture of the fundamental institutions of the Romanian state, as they are constitutionally defined and practically organised. These institutions represent the main targets of influence operations, and their coordinated weakening is the central objective of the aggressors.

Figure 1: Organisational Chart of the Fundamental Institutions of the Romanian State

This organisational chart illustrates the complexity of the Romanian institutional architecture and the interdependencies between the different powers and authorities. The principle of the separation of powers in the state, constitutionally enshrined (Constitution of Romania, art. 1 para. 4), is fundamental for the functioning of democracy. Each of these institutions represents a potential target of information aggression:

• The legislative authority is targeted to induce decision-making blockages and to discredit the representative democratic process
• The executive authority is targeted to erode governance capacity and to create the perception of chronic incompetence
• The judicial authority is targeted to undermine trust in the rule of law and in the capacity to sanction abuses
• The Head of State is targeted as a symbol of national unity and strategic orientation
• The constitutional institutions (CCR, Court of Accounts, etc.) are targeted to contest the legitimacy of their decisions
• The law and order institutions (SRI, Police, etc.) are targeted to create the perception of a “parallel state” or of repressive structures
• The local public administration is targeted to fragment national cohesion and amplify regional dissent

Information aggression acts synchronously upon these institutions, aiming to create a generalised state of distrust and institutional chaos that will paralyse the state’s capacity for reaction.

3. MODALITIES OF ACTION WITHIN INFORMATION AGGRESSION

3.1. Creation of Political Entities

3.1.1. The Artificial Genesis of Political Actors

One of the most effective ways of influencing political life is the creation of entities that promote desired narratives, without being identifiable as instruments of the aggressor. In the case of Romania, this process has been documented in detail in the SRI reports concerning the campaign of Călin Georgescu (SRI, 2024).

According to declassified data, the network that supported Georgescu’s rise was built starting in 2016, long before he became a significant public figure (Mutler, 2025). The first accounts were created years earlier, to gradually build a digital infrastructure capable of massively amplifying a message in a very short time.

The operational model included three distinct phases (SRI, 2024; Anghel, 2025):

1. Construction of infrastructure: Creation of tens of thousands of accounts, organised in coordinated networks, capable of generating artificial traffic and engagement
2. Preparation of targets: Identification of micro-segments of the electorate and creation of non-political pages to attract readers and build loyal audiences
3. Creation of the “ideal president”: Production of hundreds of professional videos, adapted to each segment, to build the image of a candidate who would respond to specific aspirations and fears

3.1.2. The Choice of the Formation’s Name as a Result of Political Marketing Studies

A crucial aspect of the creation of political entities is the choice of name, which is never accidental, but the result of careful studies of political marketing and the understanding of collective psychology.

The case of the AUR party (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) is eloquent. Founded in September 2019, the party scheduled its official launch for 1 December 2019 – Romania’s National Day, which celebrates the union of Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina with the Romanian Kingdom in 1918 (Soare, 2023). The party’s logo alludes to the borders of “Greater Romania”, suggestively extending over the current Republic of Moldova.

This choice is not merely symbolic, but strategic:

• Emotional charge: Names and symbols awaken deep affective resonances, linked to national identity and moments of collective pride
• Historical legitimisation: Association with founding moments of the nation confers an aura of legitimacy beyond current political disputes
• Differentiation from the “system”: While traditional parties use technical denominations (social-democrat, liberal), the new entities appeal to the identity register, positioning themselves as authentic representatives of the nation, not of particular interests

The comparative study of illiberal discourse in Romania and Hungary (Lukács, 2024) shows that these techniques of political branding are essential for building movements with significant electoral impact. The appeal to emotion, to identity and to victimisation narratives creates strong ties with the electorate, difficult to counteract with rational arguments.

3.1.3. The Choice of Persons to be Representative for Political Formations, as a Result of Political Marketing Studies

If the choice of name creates the identity framework of the formation, the selection of persons who will publicly represent that formation is perhaps even more important. In the context of information aggression, this selection is not based on traditional criteria (seniority in the party, meritocracy, proven loyalty), but on a careful analysis of the potential to attract and mobilise different segments of the electorate.

The typology of artificially constructed candidates:

The case of Călin Georgescu perfectly illustrates this process. The analysis of the 600 videos produced for his campaign reveals a careful, almost scientific, construction of the image of an “ideal president” for different categories of voters (SRI, 2024; Mutler, 2025):

• For the young, urban, educated public: Georgescu appeared in the guise of an international expert, with a UN career, speaking fluent English and proposing a modern vision, of the “system reset” type
• For the rural, older, traditionalist public: The same candidate appeared in the guise of the deeply religious nationalist, speaking about ancestral values, about faith and about national rebirth
• For the sovereignist and anti-system public: Georgescu was constructed as the prophet revealing the “truth” about global conspiracies and the betrayal of the elites
• For the public nostalgic for the communist period: Coded messages appeared about “order”, “stability” and “strong leadership”

This capacity to be “all things to all people” is not a coincidence, but the result of focus groups, surveys and data analyses that identified the vulnerabilities and aspirations of each segment and built personalised messages for each.

Criteria for the selection of representative persons:

Comparative analysis of several recent cases allows the identification of common criteria in the selection of persons to be promoted as leaders of artificially constructed political entities:

1. Lack of a consistent political past: Persons who do not have a well-defined political history are easier to “build” and reposition. Georgescu, for example, had been an obscure UN official, without a visible political career, which allowed the construction of an image from scratch (Mutler, 2025).
2. Personal charisma and communication skills: Regardless of the content of the message, the person must have a charismatic presence and communication skills that attract and retain attention. Georgescu’s videos were professionally produced, with fast editing and an engaging stage presence (SRI, 2024).
3. Vulnerabilities that can be exploited: Persons with vulnerabilities (financial, personal, professional) are easier to control and direct. Dependence on external support creates loyalty.
4. Capacity to embody multiple narratives: The ideal candidate must be able to be the “ambassador” of different narratives for different audiences, without appearing inconsistent.
5. Absence of compromising ties with the system: To be credible in the anti-system guise, the person must have no visible ties to traditional parties or the institutions they criticise.

The construction of George Simion as an alternative:

After Georgescu’s elimination from the race, the same techniques were applied to build the image of George Simion as the legitimate heir of the sovereignist electorate. Simion promised that, if elected, he would appoint Georgescu as prime minister, ensuring the continuity of the narrative (G4Media, 2025). This repositioning was accompanied by a massive campaign that transformed Simion’s image from “radical” to “responsible statist”, capable of taking over leadership.

Victor Ponta, in turn, entered the scene as a “dark horse”, managing to attract both the Georgescu nationalists and those who do not wish to jeopardise Romania’s membership of NATO and the EU, but are not enthusiastically pro-Western either (G4Media, 2025). This hybrid positioning perfectly illustrates the way in which political actors can be constructed and repositioned to maximise the fragmentation of the pro-European electorate.

3.1.4. Support Infrastructure: Between Activism and Manipulation

A distinctive element of the new political entities is the support infrastructure, which combines authentic activism with orchestrated influence operations.

AUR, for example, developed an extensive network of volunteers who, during the pandemic period, went door to door offering food and medicine (Soare, 2023). This “synthetic reconstruction” of community ties allowed the party to build trust and a sense of belonging among its supporters. The mobile hospital initiative, although legally contested by the Permanent Electoral Authority, consolidated AUR’s image as a “champion of ordinary people”, ready to intervene where the state fails.

In parallel, however, influence networks coordinated from the outside were functioning. The Georgescu case revealed the existence of connections with a company registered at an address in London (5 Percy Street, W1) – the same address where almost 180 other companies are registered, some of them linked to the Russian military intelligence services (GRU) (Mutler, 2025). This dual structure – visible, legitimate activism, and hidden, externally funded operations – makes counteraction extremely difficult.

3.2. Movement of Members of Entities from One Formation to Another

3.2.1. The Phenomenon of Political Migration in Romania

Changing party by local and central elected officials – a phenomenon known as party switching or political migration – represents a persistent characteristic of the Romanian political landscape, with profound effects on the stability of the party system and public trust.

Recent academic research (Ghencea & Murphy, 2024) emphasises that, although changing political loyalty sparks passionate political debates, Romanian legal literature has not yet fully conceptualised or operationalised this phenomenon. The legislative response, inspired by an incomplete understanding of the problem, has had a negative impact on intergovernmental relations at all levels.

The authors Ghencea and Murphy (2024) argue that, although discouraged in an attempt to ensure the imperative mandate, political migration has in practice taken forms contrary to the legislator’s intention, especially at the local level. It affects public trust in political parties, even if, at least declaratively, one of its fundamental causes is inter-institutional collaboration itself, since the provision of quality public services and the resolution of complex problems involve constant negotiations.

3.2.2. Political Migration as an Instrument of Disorganisation

In the context of information aggression, political migration becomes more than an endogenous phenomenon of the democratic system – it can be strategically instrumentalised to disorganise mainstream parties and facilitate the rise of actors favourable to the aggressor.

The mechanisms through which political migration serves information aggression include:

1. a) Fragmentation of the coherence of pro-European parties: Local elected officials are convinced or coerced to leave traditional parties, weakening their territorial structures and electoral mobilisation capacity. This process was evident in the 2024 elections, when the collapse of the PSD and PNL was preceded by sustained erosion of their local organisations (ro, 2025).
2. b) Creation of artificial majorities: Moving members between parties can create unstable parliamentary or local majorities, incapable of governing effectively, thus fuelling the narrative that “they’re all the same” and that the democratic system is dysfunctional.
3. c) Legitimisation of new entities: The accession of known figures to peripheral parties confers upon them an aura of respectability and credibility. When former members of mainstream parties move to AUR or other sovereignist formations, the message transmitted to the electorate is that “even they have understood that the system is corrupt”.

3.2.3. Case Study: The Transfer of the Electorate between Georgescu, Simion and Ponta

The 2024-2025 elections offered a dramatic example of the fluidity of political support and the way in which migration – not only of members, but of the electorate itself – can be orchestrated.

After Călin Georgescu’s elimination from the race, his supporters did not disappear, but reoriented towards George Simion, the leader of AUR (G4Media, 2025). Simion promised that, if elected, he would appoint Georgescu as prime minister, thus ensuring the continuity of the narrative.

At the same time, Victor Ponta – a former prime minister from the PSD – entered the scene as a “dark horse”, managing to attract both the Georgescu nationalists and those who do not wish to jeopardise Romania’s membership of NATO and the EU, but are not enthusiastically pro-Western either (G4Media, 2025). This hybrid positioning perfectly illustrates the way in which political actors can be repositioned to maximise the fragmentation of the pro-European electorate.

3.3. Dissolution of Political Entities

3.3.1. Dissolution as a Strategic Instrument

If the creation of entities and the migration of members are instruments of construction and realignment, dissolution is the instrument of strategic destruction. It can take multiple forms, from the natural disappearance of formations that have fulfilled their purpose (for example, vehicle parties for a single electoral cycle), to forcing dissolution through legal or financial pressures.

In the context of information aggression, the dissolution of entities serves the following purposes:

1. a) Erasing traces: After an influence operation has achieved its objectives (for example, polarising society or testing certain narratives), the entities involved can be dissolved to eliminate evidence and make it impossible to hold anyone accountable.
2. b) Fragmentation of the electorate: The dissolution of a party does not lead to the disappearance of its supporters, but to their dispersal towards other formations, further fragmenting the political landscape and hindering the formation of stable majorities.
3. c) Testing institutional reactions: The creation and dissolution of entities can serve to test the limits of the system – how quickly the authorities react, what legal instruments they use, how effective they are.

3.3.2. The Legal Framework for the Dissolution of Parties in Romania

The evolution of the legal framework regarding political parties in post-communist Romania has been marked by numerous modifications, but, as Popescu and Soare (2017) observe, the spirit and motivation of these modifications have remained largely the same. Parties have promoted numerous alterations to regulations knowing that, in the end, the limited changes represented an opportunity for renewed continuity.

This legal framework has created what the authors call “the artificial creation and stabilisation of political parties” (Popescu & Soare, 2017) – entities too powerful to fall, but too weak to be truly democratic or accountable. In this context, dissolution becomes a difficult instrument to use against actors who pretend to respect the rules, while systematically acting against the constitutional order.

3.3.3. The Case of Eternal Dissolution: Fascism and Communism in Romanian Political Discourse

A particular aspect of the Romanian political landscape is the persistence of sympathies for interwar extremist movements, despite the fact that they are illegal. Călin Georgescu, for example, was indicted for supporting sympathisers of the Iron Guard, a fascist and anti-Semitic movement from the interwar period, banned by law in Romania (Mutler, 2025). After the hearings, the politician was filmed making a fascist-type salute.

This reality creates a paradoxical situation: political entities that promote banned ideologies cannot be dissolved as long as they avoid explicit associations and use coded language. Dissolution thus becomes not just a legal instrument, but also a symbolic battlefield, in which accusations of “repression” and “censorship” are used to delegitimise state institutions.

4. EFFECTS ON THE COHESION AND CONSENSUS OF THE POPULATION IN ROMANIA

4.1. Cognitive Chaos and the Loss of Bearings

The cumulative effect of the creation, selection of persons, movement and dissolution of political entities, in the context of sustained information aggression, is the generation of a state of cognitive chaos at the population level. Citizens are exposed to a contradictory flow of messages, in which the boundary between reality and fiction becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish.

The annulled elections of December 2024 represented a major cognitive shock. Many Romanians did not initially believe the accusations, attributing the annulment to a conspiracy of the political elite trying to protect itself (BBC, 2025). As evidence of Russian intervention became public, attitudes partially changed, but distrust in institutions remained profound.

This cognitive chaos manifests itself through:

• Difficulty in distinguishing between credible sources and manipulated sources: Propaganda and disinformation are so pervasive that any source can be accused of bias
• Need for simple narratives: Faced with complexity, people seek simple explanations, even if false – “they’re all the same”, “it’s a conspiracy of the system”
• Cognitive dissonance: The confrontation between one’s own convictions and the evidence that contradicts them generates stress and confusion

4.2. Disorganisation of the Party System

The elections of 4 May 2025 confirmed a profound transformation of the Romanian political landscape. The results leave no room for doubt: the vote for the so-called sovereignists exceeded 50% (G4Media, 2025). An independent candidate like Nicușor Dan received more votes than Crin Antonescu, supported by a coalition of three large parties. A veritable electoral disaster.

This painful defeat marks the beginning of the end for the PSD and PNL (G4Media, 2025). The major parties that have dominated three decades of politics can no longer control their own voters. Crin Antonescu could not even gather half of the votes that the PSD and PNL obtained in the 2024 parliamentary elections.

The causes of this disorganisation are multiple:

• Disillusionment with the traditional political class: Unfulfilled promises, corruption, lack of real reforms
• Erosion of trust in institutions: Media capture, weakness of the rule of law, institutional opacity
• Success of anti-system narratives: Massively amplified by influence operations
• Fragmentation of the electorate: Migration of voters between multiple options, without the formation of stable majorities

4.3. Loss of Voter Interest in the Electoral Process

Perhaps the most worrying effect of information aggression is the loss of interest in the electoral process and, more broadly, civic disengagement.

The mechanisms producing this effect include:

1. a) Perception that the vote does not matter: The annulment of the elections, even if constitutionally justified, reinforced the narrative that the vote can be annulled at any time by the elites, that the decision does not ultimately belong to the citizens (BBC, 2025).
2. b) Confusion and information fatigue: Constant exposure to contradictory narratives, fake news and manipulations generates a state of cognitive fatigue. People withdraw, no longer follow, no longer verify, no longer participate.
3. c) Generalised cynicism: When “nothing is to be believed”, participation in the democratic process loses its meaning. Why vote when they’re all the same? Why get involved when it’s all a farce anyway?
4. d) Polarisation and demonisation of the adversary: Increasingly radical political discourse transforms democratic debate into an existential war, in which compromise and collaboration are seen as betrayal. In this climate, moderate, rational participation becomes almost impossible.

Poll data shows a constant decrease in voter turnout, especially among young people and the rural population, precisely the segments most exposed to disinformation and anti-system narratives (Anghel, 2025).

4.4. Effects on the Health Status of the Population

Information aggression has measurable consequences on the health status of the population, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO, 1948) – “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.

The psychological plane:

• Chronic anxiety generated by permanent uncertainty and the perception of diffuse threats
• Stress associated with the inability to navigate the complex information environment
• Depression and learned helplessness in the face of a system perceived as dysfunctional and corrupt

The social plane:

• Erosion of social capital and mutual trust
• Isolation and alienation, withdrawal from community life
• Polarisation that makes dialogue and cooperation impossible

The physical plane:

• The pandemic demonstrated the direct link between disinformation and risk behaviours: the lowest vaccination rate in the EU (approximately 35%) was correlated with massive exposure to disinformation
• Neglect of health due to distrust in the medical system
• Overburdening of the medical system with preventable cases

4.5. Institutional Reaction and the Democratic Dilemma

The reaction of Romanian institutions to this crisis was unprecedented, but it raised fundamental questions about the limits of democracy.

The CCR’s decision to annul the elections and remove Georgescu from the race – however justified based on the evidence of foreign interference – seemed to confirm deeply rooted suspicions that power is uncontrollable and that democracy is conditional (BBC, 2025). US Vice President J.D. Vance called the annulment “baseless”, claiming that Romania no longer shares American values, and Elon Musk called the Chief Judge of the Constitutional Court a “tyrant” (Anghel, 2025).

This reaction highlights what Veronica Anghel (2025) calls the democratic dilemma: how far can the leaders of democratic institutions go to protect the constitutional order without compromising their claim to represent the people?

The institutions passed the stress test, but emerged from this process weakened, more contested and more vulnerable to future attacks. The democratic shield worked – but at the cost of deepening the crisis of trust it was trying to resolve.

CONCLUSIONS AND STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. General Conclusions

The detailed analysis of information aggression against Romania’s interests through the influencing of political life reveals a complex, multidimensional threat, targeting the very capacity of the Romanian state to function as an autonomous and strategically oriented democracy.

The main conclusions are:

1. Information aggression against Romania is systematic and well-funded. The Georgescu case revealed the existence of a massive digital infrastructure, prepared starting in 2016, capable of generating influence on a large scale with estimated costs of over 50 million euros (SRI, 2024; Mutler, 2025).
2. The modalities of action are sophisticated and difficult to counteract. The creation of political entities through advanced techniques of political marketing and electoral branding (Lukács, 2024), the careful selection of representative persons based on detailed market studies (SRI, 2024), the migration of members as an instrument of disorganisation (Ghencea & Murphy, 2024) and the strategic dissolution for fragmenting the electorate form a complex arsenal of influence.
3. The selection of representative persons is an essential component of the strategy. The construction of Călin Georgescu as an “ideal president” for different segments of the electorate demonstrates the sophistication of these operations, which use data and marketing techniques to create political actors capable of attracting votes from diverse and contradictory sources.
4. The fundamental institutions of the state are targeted synchronously. The organisational chart of power in the Romanian state reveals the complexity of the institutional architecture and the interdependencies between the different authorities. Information aggression simultaneously targets all these institutions, aiming to create a generalised state of chaos and distrust.
5. The effects on social cohesion are profound and lasting. Cognitive chaos, the disorganisation of the party system and the loss of interest in the electoral process create a fragmented, distrustful and vulnerable society, incapable of responding unitedly to real crises.
6. The democratic dilemma is real and without simple solutions. The institutions that intervene to protect democracy risk being perceived as illegitimate, fuelling exactly the narratives they are trying to combat (Anghel, 2025).
7. The geopolitical context amplifies the threat. Romania’s position on NATO’s eastern flank, the border with Ukraine and the role in Black Sea security transform it into a priority target, and the global geopolitical realignment creates a favourable environment for revisionist actors.

5.2. Strategic Recommendations

For the intelligence community, for political decision-makers and for civil society, these conclusions impose a series of priority actions:

5.2.1. Consolidation of Detection and Counteraction Capabilities

1. a) Advanced monitoring of the information space: Development of systems capable of early detection of the construction of influence infrastructures, identifying specific patterns (coordinated accounts, artificial amplification, message synchronisation).
2. b) Close international cooperation: The exchange of information with strategic partners (NATO, EU, the Baltic states with experience in countering Russian disinformation) is essential for a complete understanding of the threat.
3. c) Increasing the transparency of political financing: Stricter regulation of donations, especially those in cryptocurrencies (as happened in the case of Peșchir, Georgescu’s funder), and monitoring of suspicious financial flows.

5.2.2. Reform of the Party System and the Political Class

1. a) Regulation of political migration: Public and legislative debate on the phenomenon of party switching, with the aim of finding a balance between freedom of association and the stability necessary for the functioning of institutions (Ghencea & Murphy, 2024).
2. b) Strengthening internal democracy in parties: Parties that are too weak to be truly democratic internally become vulnerable to infiltration and manipulation (Popescu & Soare, 2017).
3. c) Renewal of the political class: Attracting uncompromised professionals, capable of restoring trust in institutions.

5.2.3. Increasing the Cognitive Resilience of the Population

1. a) Media education in schools: Digital and media literacy must become a national priority, starting from primary school.
2. b) Awareness campaigns for adults: Programmes adapted to different segments of the population, explaining the mechanisms of manipulation and offering practical verification tools.
3. c) Support for quality journalism: Sustainable funding for independent press and professional fact-checkers.

5.2.4. Managing the Democratic Dilemma

1. a) Proactive strategic communication: Institutions must explain to the public, constantly and accessibly, why they are taking certain decisions, even when they are unpopular. Silence or bureaucratic communication amplifies distrust.
2. b) Long-term trust building: Trust is not rebuilt overnight. It takes years of predictable, transparent and responsible behaviour from institutions.
3. c) Involvement of civil society: Non-governmental organisations, universities and civic groups must be partners in defending democracy, not just passive beneficiaries.

5.2.5. Reaffirmation of Strategic Orientation

1. a) Clarification of the pro-Western message: Over 90% of Romanians support membership of NATO and the EU (Anghel, 2025). This consensus must be constantly reaffirmed and translated into visible public policies.
2. b) Combating anti-Western narratives: A strong counter-narrative is needed, explaining the concrete benefits of belonging to the Western alliances and deconstructing the myths promoted by information aggression.
3. c) Strategic partnership with the diaspora: The millions of Romanians living and working in the West are natural ambassadors of European values and can play an essential role in countering disinformation.

5.3. Final Reflection

The elections of May 2025 ended with the victory of Nicușor Dan, preserving Romania’s pro-European course (G4Media, 2025). But this victory was a narrow one – 53.6% to 46.4% – and George Simion received 5.3 million votes out of 11.5 million. One third of parliament is occupied by sovereignist forces.

The almost fatal experience of Romanian democracy is a warning not only for Romania, but for the entire Euro-Atlantic community. Information aggression is not a peripheral problem, but a central threat to democratic security. It targets our very capacity for self-governance, for maintaining our strategic orientation and for preserving the social cohesion necessary for the functioning of a free society.

In the face of this threat, there are no simple or quick solutions. It requires a sustained, coordinated and intelligent effort from all social actors. But, as the May 2025 ballot demonstrated, when institutions create the framework, and citizens choose to defend democracy, there is hope. The battle for the soul of Romanian democracy is not over – but, for now, it has not been lost.

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