Sfetcu, Nicolae (2026), Romania’s Geopolitical Position Between the Two World Wars (1919–1940): Security, Revisionism, and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, Intelligence Info, 5:1, 42-52, DOI: 10.58679/II85501, https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/romanias-geopolitical-position-between-the-two-world-wars/

 

Abstract

Romania emerged from the First World War as a substantially enlarged state – “Greater Romania” – whose strategic priorities were shaped by the postwar settlement and by the vulnerabilities created by expansion itself. The central geopolitical problem of the interwar period was how to defend new frontiers in a region where multiple neighbors regarded the Versailles-era territorial order as illegitimate or reversible. This article argues that Romanian interwar geopolitics was dominated by (1) the imperative to preserve the post-1918 territorial settlement; (2) the construction of a “status quo coalition” through regional alliances and collective-security diplomacy; and (3) the gradual erosion of that system under pressure from revisionist states and the reordering of Europe by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, culminating in Romania’s forced territorial concessions in 1940.

Keywords: Romania, First World War, Greater Romania, geopolitics, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union

Poziția geopolitică a României între cele două războaie mondiale (1919–1940): securitate, revizionism și prăbușirea Ordinului de la Versailles

Rezumat

România a ieșit din Primul Război Mondial ca un stat substanțial extins – „România Mare” – ale cărui priorități strategice au fost modelate de aranjamentul postbelic și de vulnerabilitățile create de expansiune în sine. Problema geopolitică centrală a perioadei interbelice a fost cum să apere noile frontiere într-o regiune în care mai mulți vecini considerau ordinea teritorială din epoca Versailles ca fiind ilegitimă sau reversibilă. Acest articol susține că geopolitica românească interbelică a fost dominată de (1) imperativul de a păstra aranjamentul teritorial post-1918; (2) construirea unei „coaliții de status quo” prin alianțe regionale și diplomație de securitate colectivă; și (3) erodarea treptată a acestui sistem sub presiunea statelor revizioniste și a reordonării Europei de către Germania nazistă și Uniunea Sovietică, culminând cu concesiile teritoriale forțate ale României în 1940.

Cuvinte cheie: România, Primul Război Mondial, România Mare, geopolitică, Germania nazistă, Uniunea Sovietică

 

INTELLIGENCE INFO, Volumul 5, Numărul 1, Martie 2026, pp. 42-52
ISSN 2821 – 8159, ISSN – L 2821 – 8159, DOI: 10.58679/II85501
URL: https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/romanias-geopolitical-position-between-the-two-world-wars/
© 2026 Nicolae SFETCU. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

 

Romania’s Geopolitical Position Between the Two World Wars (1919–1940): Security, Revisionism, and the Collapse of the Versailles Order

Nicolae SFETCU[1]
nicolae@sfetcu.com

[1] Divizia de Istoria Științei (DIS)/Comitetul Român de Istoria și Filosofia Științei și Tehnicii (CRIFST) al Academiei Române, ORCID: 0000-0002-0162-9973, Web of Science Researcher ID V-1416-2017

 

Introduction

Romania’s strategy in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century was to unite all the territories inhabited by Romanians into a single state and to maintain its unity. In this context, Romania had three main enemies during this period: 1) Hungary, for the control of Transylvania, assigned to Romania by the Treaty of Trianon, Northern Transylvania being offered to Hungary in 1940 by the Vienna Dictate (Second Arbitration of Vienna) and returned to Romania in 1945; 2) Bulgaria, for the control of the Quadrilateral (South Dobrogea), taken by Romania after the Second Balkan War, regained by Bulgaria in the First World War together with North Dobrogea by the Treaty of Bucharest and a secret protocol with the other Central Powers in September 1918 , ceding the territory back to Romania in 1919 by the Treaty of Neuilly, and regaining it in World War II by the Treaty of Craiova in September 1940; and 3) Russia, which occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940, and this occupation was confirmed by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty.

During the period between the two World Wars, the form of government was a parliamentary constitutional monarchy until 1938, but with great political instability: between 1928-1938, 25 governments succeeded each other in leading Romania. With the 1923 Constitution, the king was able to dissolve parliament and hold early elections. On February 11, 1938, the Royal Dictatorship of Charles II was established, with the installation of a government led by Patriarch Miron Cristea and the elaboration of a new Constitution, which entered into force on February 27, with all powers concentrated in the hands of the king. Parliamentary political parties were grouped in a National Renaissance Front and a consultative crown council was formed, several legionary leaders being arrested, including Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, shot on November 30, 1938 on the pretext of “Escape from the escort” (Giurescu and Giurescu 1971, 740–41).

Romania emerged from the First World War as a substantially enlarged state – “Greater Romania” – whose strategic priorities were shaped by the postwar settlement and by the vulnerabilities created by expansion itself. The central geopolitical problem of the interwar period was how to defend new frontiers in a region where multiple neighbors regarded the Versailles-era territorial order as illegitimate or reversible. In response, Romanian leaders constructed a dense network of alliances and legal commitments – anchored in France, the League of Nations, and regional pacts – designed to deter revisionism and to internationalize Romania’s border security. Yet by the late 1930s, the shift in the European balance of power, the weakening of collective security, and growing economic dependence on Germany undermined that architecture. Romania’s geopolitical trajectory between the wars therefore illustrates a classic dilemma of small and medium powers: security strategies built around international institutions and great-power guarantees can fail abruptly when the guarantors’ will and capability collapse.

This article argues that Romanian interwar geopolitics was dominated by (1) the imperative to preserve the post-1918 territorial settlement; (2) the construction of a “status quo coalition” through regional alliances and collective-security diplomacy; and (3) the gradual erosion of that system under pressure from revisionist states and the reordering of Europe by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, culminating in Romania’s forced territorial concessions in 1940. (Hitchins 1994a)

Romanian Army

According to the Military History of the Romanian People, Vol. VI, elaborated by the Military History Commission (Olteanu et al., 1984, vol. 6), at the beginning of 1934 the army was equipped with individual weapons for 31 divisions, 13,240 machine guns for 20 divisions; 13,587 machine guns for 37 divisions; field guns (caliber 75 and 76.2 mm) for 22 divisions; howitzers (4 batteries of 4 pieces each for one division) for 10 divisions. With the heavy artillery, two 150 mm caliber howitzer divisions and four 120 mm caliber long-barreled cannon divisions could be set up. Military aviation had 9 reconnaissance aircraft, 101 observation aircraft, 20 connecting aircraft, 35 fighter jets and 39 bombing aircraft (Olteanu et al., 1984, 6:227–28).

In 1939, the Romanian army had 300,000 new 7.92 mm caliber carbines covering only 30% of the required, and 3,500 machine guns for 70% of the equipment needs. For artillery, 248 pcs 100 mm howitzers were new, out of 630 pcs; 180 pcs 150 mm Skoda howitzers and 72 pcs 105 mm long barrel cannons of new manufacture from 222 howitzers and 183 cannons, and 24 of 47 mm caliber cannons and 500 pcs anti-tank mines (Olteanu et al., 1984, 6:227–28).

The Postwar Settlement and Romania’s Strategic Vulnerabilities

Romania’s strategic map after 1918 produced both opportunity and risk. The enlarged state contained borderlands with mixed populations and faced neighbors with competing national projects. These conditions internationalized Romania’s domestic politics: minority governance, citizenship, and border legitimacy were not merely internal matters but entangled with diplomacy and security.

A key feature of the Versailles system in East-Central Europe was the use of minority-protection regimes to stabilize new states and to provide the League of Nations with a supervisory role. Romania, like other successor and expanded states, accepted binding minority guarantees as “obligations of international concern” placed under League protection—meaning that minority disputes could become instruments of external pressure or intervention, and that Romania’s sovereignty was formally circumscribed in ways that could be exploited by revisionist propaganda.

Geopolitically, Romania faced a multi-directional threat environment:

• To the west and northwest, Hungarian revisionism focused on overturning the postwar borders, especially regarding Transylvania.
• To the south, Bulgaria contested earlier settlements in Dobruja.
• To the east, the Soviet Union posed a more existential challenge, both ideologically and territorially, given disputes tied to the postwar order.

This strategic setting encouraged Romanian elites to seek security through multilateral commitments – making Romania a “status quo” power in interwar Eastern Europe. As Keith Hitchins summarizes, the “primary objective” of Romanian foreign policy through the interwar period was the maintenance of the frontiers established after the First World War, supported across Romania’s mainstream political spectrum (with Communists as the principal exception). (Hitchins 1994a)

Building a Status Quo Coalition: Alliances and Regional Pacts, 1921–1934

The Little Entente and containment of Hungarian revisionism

The most prominent regional security structure involving Romania was the Little Entente (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), established through treaties in the early 1920s. Its purpose was to deter revisionist challenges – especially from Hungary – and to defend the territorial and political independence of its members within the Danubian basin. Romania’s participation reflected the logic of collective deterrence: any attempt to revise borders by force would confront not a single state but a bloc. (Britannica 2026)

The Romanian – Polish alliance and the eastern frontier problem

Romania also sought a complementary security mechanism on its eastern flank through alliance with Poland. The Convention on Defensive Alliance (3 March 1921) committed the parties to mutual assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack on their eastern frontiers—a clear indicator that Soviet power was treated as the primary contingency in that theatre. (gov.pl 2021)

Together, the Little Entente (primarily westward-looking) and the Romanian – Polish alliance (eastward-looking) formed a geopolitical “brace” intended to protect Romania against the two most dangerous revisionist vectors: Hungarian territorial claims and Soviet coercion.

France as external guarantor

Romanian regional alliances were closely tied to the broader French strategy of postwar containment in Eastern Europe. Romanian policymakers saw France – more than Britain – as the decisive external guarantor of the peace settlement, a point emphasized in Hitchins’ characterization of interwar Romanian diplomacy. (Hitchins 1994a)

This orientation was formalized through arrangements such as the Franco–Romanian Treaty of Friendship (10 June 1926), which symbolized Romania’s reliance on a Western patron to reinforce the regional status quo against revisionist threats. (WLII 1926)

The Balkan Entente (1934)

Romania also joined a southern regional framework: the Balkan Entente (9 February 1934), signed by Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Although the details of implementation mattered, the geopolitical rationale was straightforward: preserve the territorial status quo in the Balkans and limit revisionist pressures – particularly those associated with Bulgaria – by presenting a coordinated front among status quo states. (WLII 1934)

Collective Security and Diplomatic Strategy in the 1930s

Romanian diplomacy in the 1930s is often associated with collective security – the idea that peace could be preserved through the League of Nations, legal norms, and coordinated deterrence rather than unilateral rearmament or ad hoc balancing. The Romanian statesman Nicolae Titulescu, a leading advocate of League-centered security, explicitly framed Romanian foreign policy as grounded in League principles and the peaceful settlement of disputes. (Titulescu 1937)

This strategy had several intended advantages:

1. Internationalization of Romania’s borders: turning frontier disputes into matters of treaty law and collective guarantee rather than bilateral bargaining.
2. Deterrence through coalition politics: aligning with networks (Little Entente, Balkan Entente, Poland) to raise the cost of revisionism.
3. Great-power anchoring: expecting France (and, secondarily, Britain) to underpin the system with credible power.

But the approach depended on conditions Romania could not control: the willingness of great powers to enforce the settlement and the capacity of regional coalitions to act decisively during crises. By the mid-to-late 1930s, those conditions were deteriorating as Germany rearmed, Italy pursued its own revisionist aims, and the League’s credibility was damaged by repeated failures.

The Unraveling of the Versailles Security Architecture, 1938–1940

Strategic shock: the collapse of reliable guarantees

The late 1930s brought a structural shift: Romania’s allies and guarantors could no longer credibly enforce the status quo. Once the European balance moved decisively toward Germany (and, in Eastern Europe, toward German – Soviet bargaining power), Romania’s alliance system became less a deterrent than a diplomatic façade.

Economic penetration and dependence on Germany

Romania’s geopolitical vulnerability was intensified by economic factors – most notably the strategic value of Romanian commodities (especially oil and agricultural exports) and the leverage of German trade arrangements. The German – Romanian Treaty for the Development of Economic Relations, signed in Bucharest on 23 March 1939, is often interpreted as a marker of deepening dependence: it created institutional channels to align Romanian production and exports with German needs, embedding Romanian resources into the German war economy even before Romania formally joined the Axis. (WLII 1939)

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in Moscow, according to which the USSR claimed Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. In September 1939 Poland is invaded by Germany. In this context, the Crown Council decided on September 6, 1939, to proclaim Romania’s neutrality, securing its borders and avoiding military confrontation by activating the “Balkan Neutral Bloc” of the 1934 Balkan Agreement and trying to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR.

Romania in 1940

On June 22, 1940, the king Carol II formed the Party of the Nation. On July 4, 1940, the Ion Gigurtu government was installed, which on August 30, 1940, through the Vienna Dictate, was forced to cede half of Transylvania (“Northern Transylvania”) to Hungary, and on September 7, 1940, by the Treaty of Craiova, the “Quadrilater” was ceded to Bulgaria.

The crisis of the “Carlist” regime ends with the formation of the Ion Antonescu – Horia Sima government by Royal Decree signed by Carol II. Benefiting from the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the parliament (Giurescu 1999, 65), Antonescu demanded the abdication of the king on September 6, 1940, forming the National-Legionary State, with Horia Sima vice president of the Council of Ministers and secretary of state (Giurescu and Giurescu 1971, 742). On the same day of his enthronement as King of Romania, Mihai I issued a decree by which Antonescu had full powers as Head of the Romanian State, but with a clarification that escaped to Antonescu: The King appointed the Prime Minister. (Hitchins 1994b)

The Iron Guard, after coming to power, unleashes a wave of revenge against supporters of the previous parliamentary regime, killing 60 former dignitaries in Jilava Prison on November 27, 1940 (Georgescu 1992, 233) (Constantiniu 2011, 390), including the historian and former prime minister Nicolae Iorga and the economist Virgil Madgearu, considered the “moral authors” of Codreanu’s elimination (Albulescu and Munteanu 2004). Ion Antonescu tried to remove the Iron Guard from the government, suppressing the legionary revolt and excluding the Iron Guard from the government (Lambru 2017).

According to Petre Otu, Ion Antonescu reorganized the administration, abolishing the Ministries of Air and Navy and Army Equipment, created in 1936 and 1938 and returning to a single department, the Ministry of National Defense. He created four secretaries of state (Land, Air, Navy and Army Endowment) [1] and two naval and aviation staffs, subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. The position of Chief of the General Staff, respectively of the General Headquarters, was fulfilled between September 6, 1940 – September 17, 1941 by General Alexandru Ioanițiu (Cioflină 1995, 47–72), and Section 7 for higher education changed to Section 7 – allied armed forces[2] (Otu 2021).

1940: coercive territorial revisions

The year 1940 represented the collapse of Romania’s interwar geopolitical project.

On March 29, 1940, V. M. Molotov spoke of “the existence of an unresolved dispute, that of Bessarabia, whose annexation by Romania was never recognized by the Soviet Union, although it never raised the issue of returning Bessarabia by military means”. (Văratic 2000, p.229-230)

Soviet coercion in the east: After the fall of France and the dramatic weakening of the Western strategic position, the Soviet Union forced Romania to hand over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina following an ultimatum dated 26 June 1940, illustrating how rapidly Romania’s external guarantees evaporated. (McDougall 2026)

Axis arbitration in the west: The Second Vienna Award (arbitration by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) transferred Northern Transylvania from Romania to Hungary on 30 August 1940, showing that the revision of borders would now be managed by the new dominant powers rather than by Versailles-era institutions. The text of the arbitral award is preserved in international legal archives and records the central role of German and Italian foreign ministers in imposing the settlement. (UN 1940)

Settlement with Bulgaria in the south: Romania ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria through the Treaty of Craiova (7 September 1940), an agreement published in Romania’s official legal record. (Monitorul Oficial 1940)

Through the Hitler-Stalin Treaty, the Treaty of Craiova and the Second Arbitration of Vienna (Vienna Dictate) Romania lose over a third of its territory and over a quarter of its population), including Herța Land which was neither part of Bukovina nor from Bessarabia and had not been originally claimed by the USSR. Part of Bessarabia was attached to Ukraine, and the other part formed the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, the occupation being followed by mass deportations (Бугай 1999, 567–81)[3] and the banning of Romanian values. On June 26, 10 PM, V.M. Molotov sent a note to Gheorghe Davidescu, the head of the Romanian diplomatic mission in Moscow, calling for the “return at all costs” of Bessarabia and the surrender to the Soviet Union of the northern part of Bukovina. (Scurtu et al. 1995, 529–30) In 1940, through a simple report, the USSR took Snake Island from Romania, for strategic reasons. (Văduva 2015)

Together, these acts demonstrate not only Romania’s strategic isolation but also the replacement of the interwar security order: treaties and collective guarantees were displaced by coercive diplomacy and great-power arbitration.

Conclusion

Between the two world wars, Romania’s geopolitical situation was defined by a persistent – and ultimately untenable – effort to secure a contested territorial settlement in one of Europe’s most revisionist regions. Romania’s interwar grand strategy emphasized border preservation through (1) alliances with neighboring status quo states (Little Entente, Balkan Entente), (2) a targeted defensive partnership with Poland on the eastern frontier, and (3) reliance on France, Britain, and the League of Nations as guarantors of the broader international order. (Hitchins 1994a)

Gheorghe Văduva states that Russia, as one of the empires in the vicinity of Romania, has always been interested in the Black Sea-Baltic Sea strategic line, which affects northern Bukovina and the territory between Prut and Dniester, considered a strategic security area for the Russian Empire. Thus, the unification of the Romanian states contradicted the geopolitical interests of the three great neighboring empires. (Văduva 2015)

According to Alesandru Duțu, Romania had become isolated on the international arena, after the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (August 23, 1939) (Constantiniu 1991), the loss of territories in 1940 (Dutu and Ignat 2000), and practically forced to enter the sphere of influence. of Germany by joining the Tripartite Pact (November 23, 1940), according to Ion Gheorghe, the former Romanian ambassador to Berlin, “an official act without persuasive power”, a “political opportunism” (Gheorghe 1996, 17) (Duțu 2016).

That strategy contained a structural vulnerability: Romania’s security depended on external credibility more than on autonomous power. When collective security weakened and Western guarantees failed, Romania became exposed to simultaneous pressures from the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria – pressures mediated or exploited by Germany. The cascading territorial losses of 1940 were not an abrupt anomaly but the culmination of an interwar geopolitical reality: in a region where multiple actors sought revision, and where great powers were willing to bargain over smaller states’ borders, the survival of the status quo required enforcement that Romania and its regional partners could not supply alone.

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Note

[1] Romanian National Military Archives (A.N.M.R.), fund 948, Section 7, file no. 2, f.28 (Decree Law no. 34 888 of October 16, 1940)..

[2] A.M.N.R, fund 948, Section 1, file no. 1068, p. 47.

[3] Paper based on NKVD archives