Zărnescu, Narcis (2024), Ethics and Intelligence, Intelligence Info, 3:4, https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/ethics-and-intelligence/

 

Abstract

Is there a Science of Intelligence? The answer is affirmative, as evidenced by the numerous academic projects launched by universities worldwide, including those in Europe, the United States, Japan, and China. In an era of globalized strategic intelligence and expanding secret services, fueled by the digital and AI revolutions, this paper seeks to define the role of moral values.

Keywords: Science of Intelligence, learning by building, ethical intelligence

Etica și intelligence

Rezumat

Există o știință a intelligence? Răspunsul este afirmativ, dovadă fiind numeroasele proiecte academice lansate de universități din întreaga lume, inclusiv cele din Europa, Statele Unite, Japonia și China. Într-o eră a inteligenței strategice globalizate și a serviciilor secrete în expansiune, alimentată de revoluțiile digitale și AI, această lucrare încearcă să definească rolul valorilor morale.

Cuvinte cheie: știința intelligence, învățarea prin construirea, intelligence etică

 

Ethics and Intelligence

Narcis ZĂRNESCU[1]

mithra.zurban@gmail.com

[1] Professor, with doctorates in both Philology and Economics; Editor-in-Chief of ACADEMICA (Romanian Academy); member of Academy of Romanian Scientist; member of German-Romanian Academy (Baden-Baden); member of the Editorial Board of Studies and Communications at CRIFST’s Division of the History of Science; member of Romanian Writers’ Union; member of Romanian Journalists’ Union; Knight of the Order of PALMES ACADEMIQUES.

 

INTELLIGENCE INFO, Volumul 3, Numărul 4, Decembrie 2024, pp.
ISSN 2821 – 8159, ISSN – L 2821 – 8159,
URL: https://www.intelligenceinfo.org/ethics-and-intelligence/
© 2024 Narcis ZĂRNESCU. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

 

Towards a „Science of Intelligence”

A German university has made a compelling case for the establishment of a Science of Intelligence.[1] The university has developed a robust academic framework, including specialized programs and curricula, to support this endeavor.[2] The core mission of the Science of Intelligence Cluster (SCIoI) is to elucidate the nature of intelligence through the construction and evaluation of computational models. By systematically examining diverse manifestations of intelligence, researchers seek to uncover fundamental principles and identify potential applications[3].

„Employing a ‘learning by building’ methodology, our research on intelligence is primarily focused on the systematic analysis and classification of the synthetic components of intelligence[4]. Concurrently, the conduct of primary and secondary research, as well as the assessment of information, gives rise to complex ethical considerations. Meta-research is essential to develop robust ethical frameworks and methodologies to guide our investigations[5]. To facilitate the achievement of these objectives, we have established a specialized research infrastructure, as detailed in schema[6].”

Some uncomfortable questions. Moral values versus constitutional rights?

A paradoxical situation has emerged wherein the proliferation of ethical codes and deontological frameworks appears to be accompanied by a decline in moral values. Ethics, once a cornerstone of societal and institutional life, has become marginalized. This is particularly evident in the realm of information management, where the absence of robust ethical frameworks has facilitated the exploitation of technological advancements for nefarious purposes. The recurring practice of legislating under pressure, particularly in the information domain, further exacerbates this problem by undermining democratic principles and tacitly compromising moral values[7].

Models, directions, trends.

The prevailing paradigms within the field, as exemplified by a comprehensive study I consulted in German, continue to adhere to traditional models of power, namely military, economic, and ideological[8]. While these models offer valuable insights, they exhibit a notable deficiency in their failure to address the ethical dimensions of information activities. The sole emphasis on efficiency overlooks the broader moral implications. Furthermore, a companion study within this volume delves into the utilization of IT for surveillance purposes, focusing on both the economic and psychological aspects. However, the ethical considerations inherent in such practices are conspicuously absent.

„The implementation of surveillance measures invariably results in the exertion of control. The Federal Labor Court has employed the term ‘surveillance pressure’ to characterize the detrimental consequences of comprehensive monitoring. The court has posited that such practices induce employees to modify their behavior accordingly.”

„The court has highlighted a ‘perfidy specific to changes in behavior’ that arises from surveillance. This phenomenon occurs when individuals, whether voluntarily or involuntarily monitored, adapt their behavior to meet perceived expectations, leading to a form of psychological manipulation. In response, courts have imposed ‘increasingly greater restrictions’ and ‘limited options for action’ to mitigate these effects (Effects on employees)[9].”

If ethical considerations are completely disregarded in the monitoring of productive activities, what implications does this have for the monitoring of potential suspects? It appears that the overriding goal of minimizing costs and maximizing profits has always been a driving force, regardless of ethical concerns. This is clearly stated in the text without any attempt to justify or hide this fact:

„The utilization of digital surveillance to exert control over employees and optimize profitability is an integral component of contemporary capitalist enterprises […]”[10].

A potential answer to our earlier rhetorical question is found in the study Internet-Regulierung: Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen globalen Governance-Modell?‘ (Internet Regulation: Towards a New Global Governance Model?)[11]. This study provides a clear and objective analysis. The introduction is straightforward, and we will see how the author develops an amoral argumentative framework, in the Nietzschean sense, or immoral from the perspective of traditional European ethics, based on these common and familiar claims:

„As the material-technical bedrock of the 21st-century global information society, the internet has profoundly permeated both national and international political and economic spheres. With a user base exceeding one billion and an e-commerce market valued in the trillions, its influence is undeniable. It is therefore inevitable that the internet has become a focal point of political discourse.”[12].

Surveillance and intelligence strategies are inherent to this proposed global internet regulation. While intelligence operations are not explicitly stated, the internet’s updatable nature makes it accessible to powerful actors. The ‘internet governance’ debate is positioned as a cultural conflict over the future shape of policies. It is about developing new concepts to address 21st-century challenges, which will in turn create new values for the information age. Thus, power dynamics inevitably influence Market adaptations.Consequently, in the presence of power, Markets begin to adjust, leading to conflicts between those seeking to maintain traditional spheres of influence and those advocating for innovative ideas and decentralized decision-making[13].

However, a question of profound and dramatic significance arises, particularly in Europe: how can state sovereignty be defined, imposed, and defended in the virtual, digital, and cybernetic realm? Wolfgang Kleinwächter argues that the unlimited cybernetic space will not become, under any circumstances, a lawless zone[14]. ‘What is illegal offline does not become legal online.’ Of course, there are and will continue to be gray areas that are difficult to codify, legalize, and understand formally from a legal standpoint. Implicitly, there are and will be increasingly more collisions between national jurisdictions:

„The concept of state sovereignty traditionally extends to territorial boundaries. While the cybernetic realm is inherently boundless, this does not entail the abrogation of national sovereignty within this digital domain.”[15]

A comprehensive analysis of this study is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is evident that the author’s arguments are rooted in a romanticized and utopian perspective on the internet. While the study’s objective was ostensibly different, its findings inadvertently underscore the persistent threat of cyberterrorism, despite the existence of intricate regulatory frameworks. Like intelligence strategies, this analysis highlights a troubling trend towards the erosion of traditional ethical values, as they are replaced by more fluid concepts aligned with democratic, transnational, and corporate interests.

The French school has a different approach, diplomatic, refined, elegant, but still falling within approximately the same parameters of „hypocrisy and duplicity”, necessary and specific to this field of activity[16]. There is no doubt that the moral model of intelligence services is modeled after classical models such as the Jesuit Order, Societas Jesu (1534), founded among others by Ignatius of Loyola, or the Santa Inquisición (1184).

A comparative study between these ethical typologies, Jesuit-Inquisitorial on the one hand, and the classical, modern ethical model for Intelligence, on the other, could reveal unknown details from the secret history of territorial protection, the struggle to defend community interests, the conquest of new territories and peoples, of increasing well-being and profit, using any means, whose aggressiveness, cruelty, and efficiency are codified in the name of God or the national interest. Thus, we will be revealed various behavioral and mental permanences, adjudicated by the culture of corporality, but also by the culture of spirituality, both defining the doubling and duplicity of the eternal homo duplex[17].”

Returning to the French school, we note certain differences in approach compared to the Anglo-Saxon school of Intelligence. We will note only a few details: the authors make a clear distinction between the lobbying of Intelligence actors, on the one hand, and the ethical and legal positions of companies, NGOs defending human rights, or of jurisdictions and independent authorities. A rigorous distinction is also made, at least theoretically, between „public data”, which in a democracy are „transparent”, and „personal data”, which fall under the constitutional protection of the individual’s personal freedom. In conclusion,

„Guaranteeing rights therefore imposes a principle of conditioning any massive collection of personal data on the anonymization of data: the state must exclude from big data any data collection whose irreversibility of anonymization is not certain. But intelligence activities can obviously be carried out only under conditions that derogate from this principle”[18].

The stakes, as the author also noted, are ultimately simple to formulate but difficult to achieve: maintaining real elementary freedoms in a world revolutionized by the surveillance tools at the authorities’ disposal[19]. We observe that moral values are either intentionally ignored or exiled to a utopian context, where they remain prisoners.

Ethical Dysfunctions in Intelligence Communities

Within any intelligence community, leaders play a fundamental role in a nation’s security. They often deal with disruptive information and employ tactics that fall outside of ethical codes to obtain information about potential threats to the economy or national interest. Therefore, even if a researcher is uncomfortable with ethical dysfunctions, they must analyze the moral paradox of intelligence scenarios and situations, as well as the methods of management in intelligence agencies. Although intelligence practices are considered unethical and illegal in public life, they become morally acceptable in the world of intelligence services when national security is at stake or at risk[20]. One might ask whether intelligence practice demands a different type of ethical value? A different deontology, distinct from that specific to standard sciences? In various reports and notes, some authors observe the increasing inconsistencies between the traditional value system and the new challenges generated by the evolution of liberal, democratic societies, to which intelligence communities must respond rapidly, asymmetrically, and systematically[21]. In other materials, in addition to the usual aporias, models of trans-ethical micro-axiologies are proposed to solve the ethical paradox.

A certain legend holds that the famous CIA is a product of the moral and political reality of the United States of America. Created by the National Security Act of 1947, it has its origins in the political philosophy of the New World. What I find noteworthy in this urban legend is a publicity element, a semi-fake, namely that no other special service in the world has been the subject of such intense ethical reflection on its right to operate in peacetime[22].

In a classic collective work, „The CIA and the American Ethic, an Unfinished Debate” (1979), the ethical code and deontology practiced by the CIA in the last century are evaluated[23]. Among the co-authors, Ernest W. Lefever and Roy Godson advocate for „ethics for responsible intelligence”[24]. Using the explicit categories of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist, historian, and diplomat, Lefever starts from the observation that, in ideological conflict with two expansionist communist powers (the USSR and China), equipped with nuclear weapons, the US government would be irresponsible and criminal not to develop an efficient intelligence service. American legal circles have organized think tanks, debates, conferences, etc., in short, there has been intense reflection on this subject, which has resulted in the crystallization of at least two „schools” in the field:

 

[1] The first school argues that espionage is not illegal, even if it is an „unfriendly” act, as intrusion into the lives of other nations is a general trend. Geoffrey Demarest supports this idea with an unexpected piece of evidence, namely that even the United Nations, towards the end of the 20th century, was granted the right to conduct secret investigations[25]. Consequently, Demarest believed that the death penalty for espionage in peacetime should be prohibited. In the same logic, Roger Scott, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes defensive war, including as a preventive measure, considered espionage to be part of the authorized arsenal for this purpose[26].

[2] The second school of legal thought, on the contrary, considers espionage to be illegal. Manuel Garcia-Mora[27] and Quincy Wright, placing their discourse in a transnational perspective, consider espionage in peacetime to be a crime and a violation of international law. The argument is that espionage undermines „the territorial integrity of states and their independence”[28] Quincy Wright further denounces any form of clandestine action, including psychological warfare. Beyond differences and divergences, legal experts in the ethics specific to the intelligence field agree on one fundamental principle: democracy and the development of invisible structures within it form two consubstantial realities. Moreover, most states, which recognize legislative power of a parliamentary type, have developed intelligence services.

 

Yet, amidst the myriad of hypotheses and certainties, a more menacing question looms: to what extent, when, and why is a democratic system forced to produce its own illegality and its own moral and legislative arbitrariness? The answers to „when” and „why” seem simple: as a result of international political and economic pressures and threats. The answer to „to what extent” is impossible to give and, in any case, will have to remain classified for at least a century.

While awaiting declassification, we can enumerate, along with many North American experts in the fascinating field of Intelligence, a few corollaries: (i) a first possible corollary: intelligence services are subsidiary. Being subsidiary, they cannot be representative of the image and symbolism of the state. On the other hand, many historians have tried over time, for reasons of state of course, to minimize or even censor the importance and impact of intelligence services in the evolution of conflicts or even in rewriting certain chapters of history. Despite these efforts, which aim to preserve and conserve a pure but unfortunately increasingly oxidized and toxic image of Western democracy, the compromising truth has almost always come to light. (ii) A second possible corollary: experts demonstrate, with technical arguments, that in the American intelligence community, the distinction between territorial protection and foreign intelligence is undermined by numerous dysfunctions and corresponds to an artificial and counterproductive logic. (iii) A third possible corollary: the functioning of the ‘secret state’ inevitably generates perverse effects, consequences confirmed without exception by history: any intelligence service, regardless of the regime, has as its primary objectives (a) its own government, (b) the other internal services, theoretically partners, and (c) its own citizens. (iv) A fourth possible corollary: the rule of compartmentalization: within an intelligence agency, no one knows the material and human modalities of all operations. As such, any intelligence institution assumes from the outset the risk that a service, an office, or a member may ‘escape’ from executive control. (v) A fifth possible corollary: services cannot function properly if the political power constantly scrutinizes them, although the rule of law and the secret state are consubstantial and shape each other[29].

Toward a Conclusion

As I delved deeper into the bibliography, it became increasingly clear that the ethical dilemmas and debates that have unfolded over the past 50-60 years, staged with the consent of the politico-military elite, regardless of country or regime, for the intolerant and blind media and public, are a seemingly responsible way of manipulating truths and objectives, the revelation of which is indefinitely postponed. When, finally, the archives are opened and the interested public – or rather, the survivors, because in the meantime people have aged, fallen ill, and died – storms in, what do they find? Endless kilometers of files, 90% anonymized. Therefore, the game resumes, lies, mockery, and manipulation become more subtle; survivors react naively and aberrantly, invent conspiracy theories, become prisoners of their own fantasies, and become „radicalized,” caught in the carousel of ephemeral and ridiculous extremism.

However, there is an antidote we can invest in, even if the success rate is meager: education. Therefore, returning to the joint project of the two German universities – the Technical University and Humboldt University, both in Berlin – I syllabify and translate it into other European languages, hoping to arouse the interest of institutions or private entrepreneurs: the scientific objective of SCIoI is to unite the disciplines involved in intelligence research[30]. Being a substantial challenge, a scientific advisory board will be needed, composed of ‘pioneers’ in the study of intelligence, scientists who possess vast experience in interdisciplinary research. Coming from different fields of intelligence research, covering both the study of natural intelligence and the study of artificial intelligence, each member of the scientific advisory board should have extensive experience in building inter and transdisciplinary bridges and, above all, be able to be a good mentor and an „inspirational” person, or more precisely, an inspiration generator. These are just a few of the basic conditions if we want to achieve the goal of building a Unified Science of Intelligence[31].

The topic of intelligence research naturally raises ethical questions[32]. What are the risks and how can we control them now and in the future? To address these issues and ensure compliance with ethical standards, an external ethics advisory board will always be needed, selected from experts in the fields of intelligence philosophy, artificial intelligence, general and digital ethics, robotics, and law. Each member of the board will, of course, contribute their expertise to monitoring and respecting the ethical principles and guidelines programmed for the overall research. As a component of the conclusions, I reaffirm that this study, Ethics and Intelligence, like my other works, represents a subjective and personal way of expressing my unwavering conviction that the competent institutions can mobilize and initiate such a project at any time.

I also believe that among us, Romanians who have learned and are learning, who know how to dream, pragmatically and generously, there will always be born another Aurel Vlaicu or Henri Coandă, another Ștefan Odobleja, Horia Hulubei or Șerban Țițeica, another Ioan Cantacuzino or George Emil Palade, another Ștefania Mărăcineanu or Ana Aslan, and the list can go on.

Bibliography

[1] Bar-Joseph, U. (2010). „The professional ethics of intelligence analysis”. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 24 (1). [http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/doi/pdf/10.1080/08850607.2011.519222] [2] Biegel, Andreas, Überwachung von Arbeitnehmern durch technische Einrichtungen, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2000.

[3] Bimfort, M. (1995). A definition of intelligence, released by the CIA historical review program.[https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm].

[4] Bisky, Lothar, Konstanze Kriese, Jürgen Scheele (eds.), Medien – Macht – Demokratie. Neue Perspektiven, Berlin, 2009, Karl Dietz Verlag. [https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Publ-Texte/Texte–54.pdf].

[5] Born, H. & Wetzling, T. (2009). „Intelligence accountability. Challenges for parliaments and intelligence services”. In L.K. Johnson (eds.), Handbook of intelligence studies London: Routledge.

[6] Born, H. & Wills, A. (2010). „Beyond the oxymoron. Exploring ethics through the intelligence cycle”. In J. Goldman (eds.), Ethics of spying: A reader for the intelligence professional. Scarecrow Press, Portland, USA.

[7] Bowen, M. (2003). „The dark art of interrogation”. The Atlantic Monthly, 292(3), pp. 51–76. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/doc‑

view/223090798/fulltextPDF?accountid= 14723].

[8] Brown, M.E., Trevino, L.K., & Harrison, D.A. (2005). „Ethical leadership: A social learning perspective for construct development and testing”.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), pp. 117–134. [http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/science/article/pii/S0749597805000397#].

[9] Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. New York: Harper and Row.

[10] Ciulla, J. B. (2004). Ethics and leadership effectiveness. In J. Antonakis, J. Cianciolo, & R. Sternberg (Eds.) The nature of leadership, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, (pp. 302–327).

[11] Ciulla, J.B., Price, T.L., Murphy, S.E. (2005). The quest for moral leaders: Essays on leadership ethics.

[http://www.uql.eblib.com.au.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/312patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=240759&echo=1&userid=VsMIJlHtGrgJnYzWYW%2b1Tp%2fFOxqwrrsy&tstamp=1361857698&id=2EB3F0F58 6658C641F0B6F8D81D9153981D27B6C].

[12] David, Fr., „SERVICES SECRETS, EFFICIENCE ET ÉTHIQUE. Quelques enseignements contemporains à tirer de l’institutionnalisation de la CIA en 1945–1961” in Après-demain, 2016/1 N ° 37, NF.

[13] Demarest, Geoffrey B. (1996). „Espionage in International Law”, in Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, n° 24.

[14] Dubois, Jean-Pierre, „Nos droits face aux « big data »: quels enjeux, quels risques, quelles garanties?” in Après-demain, 2016/1 (N° 37, NF). [https://www.cairn.info/revue-apres-demain–2016–1-page–6.htm].

[15] Garcia-Mora, Manuel R. (1964). „Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses under the Law of Extradition”, in University of Pittsburgh Law Review, n° 26.

[16] Hulnick, A. & Mattausch, D., „Ethics and morality in U.S. secret intelligence”. In Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 12 (1), 1989.

[17] Lefever, Ernest W., Roy Godson (1979), The CIA and the American Ethic, an Unfinished Debate, Washington, Georgetown University.

[18] Morgan Jones, Jennifer, „Is Ethical Intelligence a Contradiction in Terms? ”. In Jan Goldman (dir.), Ethics of Spying, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, inc., 2010.

[19] Scott, Roger D. (1999), Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, in Air Force Law Review, n° 46.

[20] The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy (ed. Judith Simon), London, 2020, Routledge.

[21] Zărnescu, Narcis, A Comparative Historical Investigation into Intelligence and Modular Ethics [forthcoming, 2025].

Sitography

[22] https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/.

[23] https://doi.org/10.3917/apdem.037.0006.

[24] http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/ .

[25] https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/about-us/eab/

Notes

[1] Technical University of Berlin and Humboldt University of Berlin. The Berlin Cluster for Science of Intelligence (SCIoI) aims to foster a deeper understanding of intelligence, encompassing artificial, individual, and collective forms. Researchers from diverse fields, including psychology, robotics, computer science, philosophy, and behavioral research, leverage their findings to develop innovative intelligent technologies. The cluster’s methodological strategy introduces a novel approach to intelligence research, mandating the embodiment of all knowledge, methods, concepts, and theories within technological artifacts, such as robots and computer programs. These artifacts serve as a common „lingua franca” to facilitate transdisciplinary scientific dialogue.

[2] [https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/].

[3] A Different Approach to H. Born & A. Wills (2010). Beyond the Oxymoron. Exploring Ethics through the intelligence cycle”. In J. Goldman (eds.), Ethics of spying: A reader for the intelligence professional. Scarecrow Press, Portland, USA.

[4] For a comprehensive transatlantic approach Vedi M. Bimfort (1995). A definition of intelligence, released by the CIA historical review program. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm].

[5] U. Bar-Joseph, „The professional ethics of intelligence analysis”. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 24(1), (2010). pp. 22–43.

[6] [https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/research/structure/].

[7] M. Bowen (2003). The dark art of interrogation. The Atlantic Monthly, 292(3), 51–76. [http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/docview/223090798/ fulltextPDF?accountid= 14723].

[8] „ […] drei heißbegehrte Quellen der Macht wieder in den strategischen Griff zu bekommen: den militärischen, den ökonomisch-finanziellen und den ideologischen Bereich”. [Dan Schiller, „Der Informationskrieg”, in Lothar Bisky, Konstanze Kriese, Jürgen Scheele (eds.) Medien – Macht – Demokratie. Neue Perspektiven, Berlin, 2009, Karl Dietz Verlag, p. 230; [https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Publ-Texte/Texte– 54.pdf].

[9] „Auswirkungen auf die Beschäftigten – Überwachung produziert Kontrolle In verschiedenen Urteilen zum Thema hat das Bundesarbeitsgericht den Begriff des »Überwachungsdrucks« benutzt, um die schädlichen Auswirkungen einer umfassenden, anlassunabhängigen Überwachung zu benennen. Auch das Gericht geht davon aus, dass solche Überwachungen Verhaltensanpassungen der Beschäftigten nach sich ziehen. Eine besondere Perfidie der durch Überwachungsmaßnahmen hervorgerufenen Verhaltensänderungen ist, dass die Betroffenen sich mit der freiwilligen oder erzwungenen Unterwerfung unter die benannten oder vermuteten Erwartungen der Überwachenden gleichzeitig vieler Möglichkeiten, an diesem Zustand etwas zu ändern, berauben und mit steigenden Restriktionen ihre Handlungsmöglichkeiten immer weiter einschränken.” [Marco Tullney, „Digitale Überwachung im Büro – neue Risiken für Beschäftigte” in loc.cit. Lothar Bisky, Konstanze Kriese, Jürgen Scheele (eds.) Medien – Macht – Demokratie. Neue Perspektiven, p. 309].

[10] „Die digitale Überwachung von abhängig Beschäftigten zum Zwecke ihrer Kontrolle und der Maximierung von Profiten gehört zur Arbeit im Kapitalismus hinzu, sie stellt insofern keine besondere Variante dar und erfordert auch nicht eine besonders niedere Gesinnung von Vorgesetzten oder Arbeitgeber/-innen.” [Idem, Ibidem, p. 313]. VIDE Andreas Biegel, Überwachung von Arbeitnehmern durch technische Einrichtungen, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2000.

[11] Wolfgang Kleinwächter, „Internet-Regulierung: Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen globalen

Governance-Modell?” in loc. cit., p. 317.

[12] „Das Internet ist die materiell-technische Infrastruktur der globalen Informationsgesellschaft des 21. Jahrhunderts. Die Zahl der Internetnutzer hat die Milliardengrenze überschritten. Die Größe des eCommerce-Marktes wird mit mehreren Billionen Dollar angegeben. Damit greift das Internet tief in politische und wirtschaftliche Prozesse sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf internationaler Ebene ein. Insofern ist es nicht

verwunderlich, dass immer mehr Fragen, die mit dem Internet direkt oder indirekt verbunden sind, zum Gegenstand politischer Kontroversen werden”. [Idem, ibidem, p. 317].

[13] Idem, ibidem, p. 318.

[14] For a comparative perspective, see Andreas Biegel, Überwachung von Arbeitnehmern durch technische Einrichtungen, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2000.

[15] „Der grenzenlose Cyberspace wird dabei keineswegs zum rechtsfreien Raum. Was offline rechtswidrig ist, wird online nicht legal. Es entstehen aber Grauzonen und neue, noch nicht verrechtlichte Bereiche, die formaljuristisch schwer zu fassen sind. Es kommt immer häufiger zu Kollisionen zwischen nationalen Jurisdiktionen, in denen ein und dieselben Sachverhalte unterschiedlich geregelt sind. Die Souveränität eines Staates beschränkt sich auf die Ausübung der Personalund Territorialhoheit und endet an den Landesgrenzen. Der Cyberspace aber ist grenzenlos. Das heißt natürlich nicht, dass nationale Souveränität im Cyberspace verschwindet”. [idem, ibidem, p. 319]. [„The unlimited cyberspace does not turn into a lawless space. Illegal activities offline remain illegal online. Nevertheless, gray areas and new, unregulated areas arise that are difficult to define legally. There are increasing conflicts between national jurisdictions regarding the same issues. A state’s sovereignty is limited to its territory and citizens. Cyberspace, however, is without borders. This does not imply that national sovereignty ceases to exist in the digital realm.”].

[16] Jean-Pierre Dubois, „Nos droits face aux « big data »: quels enjeux, quels risques, quelles

garanties?” in Après-demain, 2016/1 (N ° 37, NF), pp. 6–9. [https://www.cairn.info/revue

apres-demain–2016–1-page–6.htm], [https://doi.org/10.3917/apdem.037.0006].

[17] Cf. Narcis Zărnescu, On Intelligence and Modular Ethics: A Comparative Historical Study [to be published in 2025].

[18] Jean-Pierre Dubois, loc.cit..

[19] Idem, ibidem.

[20] A. Hulnick, & Mattausch, D., „Ethics and morality in U.S. secret intelligence”. In Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 12 (1), 1989, pp. 509–522. [http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hjlpp12&collectio n=journals&page=509].

[21] For a complementary perspective, refer to H. Born & T. Wetzling (2009). „Intelligence

accountability. Challenges for parliaments and intelligence services”. In L.K. Johnson (eds.), Handbook of intelligence studies London: Routledge, pp. 315–328.

[22] François David, „SERVICES SECRETS, EFFICIENCE ET ÉTHIQUE. Quelques enseignements contemporains à tirer de l’institutionnalisation de la CIA en 1945–1961” in Après-demain, 2016/1 N ° 37, NF, pp. 27–29. Cf. Jennifer Morgan Jones, Is Ethical Intelligence a Contradiction in Terms?, in Jan Goldman (dir.), Ethics of Spying, Toronto, The Scarecrow Press, inc., 2010, pp. 21–33.

[23] To gain a more contemporary understanding of this topic, consultJ. B. Ciulla (2004). „Ethics and leadership effectiveness”. In J. Antonakis, J. Cianciolo, & R. Sternberg (Eds.) The nature of leadership, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, (pp. 302–327); J. B. Ciulla et alii., (2005). The quest for moral leaders: Essays on leadership ethics…

[24] Ernest W. Lefever et Roy Godson (1979), The CIA and the American Ethic, an Unfinished

Debate, Washington, Georgetown University.

[25] Geoffrey B. Demarest (1996). „Espionage in International Law”, in Denver Journal of

International Law and Policy, n° 24, 1996, pp. 321, 347–348.

[26] Roger D. Scott (1999). Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law,

in Air Force Law Review, n° 46, pp. 217–226.

[27] Manuel R. Garcia-Mora (1964). Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses under

the Law of Extradition, in University of Pittsburgh Law Review, n° 26, 1964, pp. 65, 79–80.

[28] John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, in Jan Goldman (dir.), Ethics of Spying. A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, Oxford, The Scarecrow Press, vol. 2, 2010, p. 151

[29] Cf. François David, loc.cit.; Jean-Pierre Dubois, „Nos droits face aux « big data »: quels enjeux, quels risques, quelles garanties? ” in Après-demain, 2016/1 (N ° 37, NF), pp. 6–9. https://www.cairn.info/revue-apres-demain–2016–1-page–6.htm],  [https://doi. org/10.3917/apdem.037.0006

[30] [https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/about-us/sab/].

[31] The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy (Ed. Judith Simon), London, 2020, Routledge.

[32] [https://www.scienceofintelligence.de/about-us/eab/].